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Law in Latin America is routinely the target of systemic criticism by
U.S. commentators. Marked by underdevelopment and corruption in the
region, national legal systems are considered part of the problem and not
the solution. As a result, numerous reform proposals advocate the
internationalization of traditionally national legal domains. International
competence in the form of the Inter-American system, NAFTA, a free trade
area ofthe Americas or World Bank intervention in national judiciaries will
not, however, supplant most of the hemisphere's law. Whatever
expectations the global arena may hold, local law will continue to play a
substantial role. In addition, internationalizing reforms may actually
undermine the general goal of expanding democratic participation.
Distancing the operation of law from local reach is likely to reinforce the
very anomalies already perceived in the region. In this light, we should re-
examine our settled understandings of"Latin American law" and the latter's
widely-noted limitations. This Essay advances the task of re-thinking some
of the basic background beliefs.
The most substantial body of U.S.-based, legal writing on the region
remains the development scholarship of the 1960s and 70s. At the time,
many U.S. legal scholars turned their attention to promoting economic
development through law reform. With respect to Latin America, their
diagnosis was that excessive legal formalism constituted the main stumbling
block to growth and the redistribution of wealth. State law, the sum of
official rules and regulations, was seen as operating quite separately from
the needs and characteristics of Latin American societies. The image of a
wide gap was used to characterize the distance separating the written law,
sanctioned by the State, and the living law-the actual rules which people
follow. Moreover, the perceived disconnection of Latin American peoples
from their legal institutions was, in turn, taken as reflecting a host of
societal and cultural particularities unmet in the law. These same critiques
and images continue to be expressed today: "antiquated Latin American law
is insufficient to meet the needs of developing societies and economies";
"legal techniques are unresponsive to the societal goals of development,
efficiency and rationality"; and "judicial administration is arcane and
ineffective." Moreover, these same core beliefs can be expected to influence
the structure of hemispheric trade agreements and to inspire more program
proposals by non-governmental organizations.
Development scholars sought to address these same dysfunctions
several decades ago by proposing a range of remedies, especially in the area
of access to the courts and legal education. The legal culture, it was argued,
should better square with modernization and its priorities. New legislation
was suggested in furtherance of economic activity; new methods were
introduced to make the legal process more accessible; and, a different
conception of the role of law in society was advanced as crucial. Latin
American lawyers and legal operators were urged to exchange their
[Vol. 55
THE SIXTH ANNUAL LA7CRIT CONFERENCE
professional tools for more pragmatic implements. While never really
attaining much impact in Latin America, the Cold War project of law-and-
development quickly succumbed to its critics, not the least of whom were
some of its very practitioners. For many, the end was the result of
authoritarian Latin American governments and the manipulation of well-
intentioned reforms. Development-style legal pragmatism, it seemed, simply
lent credibility to the then reigning military rulers in the region, with its
malleable conceptions of law and legitimacy. The traditional legal formalism
of Latin America at least appeared to offer a way of holding an intractable
law, with whatever protections and guarantees it offered, over authoritarian
states and illegitimate regimes. For others, developmentalism failed because
of the shortcomings of its proponents. Armed -with an insufficient
understanding of the workings of Latin American law, these early scholars
are viewed in retrospect, by some, as not sufficiently attuned to local legal
cultures. Notably, today's neo-developmentalists stress this latter
explanation for earlier failings and are quick to note, as a course correction,
their now extensive collaboration with Latin American legal scholars and
institutions and their current advisory rather than directing roles.
In any case, while its immediate goals may have been foiled, the
scholarship of developmentalism and the framework it erected for thinking
about law in Latin America continue to have far-reaching effects. The
images it created remain well-entrenched in the minds of U.S. academics
and policy planners. First, while claiming to offer a realistic diagnosis of the
failings of Latin American legal systems, developmentalists pressed a
commonplace argumentative strategy. The gap between law and society, or
the discrepancy between social and legal spheres, is a common trope
throughoutjurisprudence. Development experts pressed this image, though,
as a way to usher in a series of broad-scale reforms. Purporting to align the
legal system with social needs, they were able to launch changes in
substantive law, legal education, and litigation, which would have in all
likelihood been more difficult if introduced piecemeal and debated on their
own merits through more open processes.
Second, developmentalism's deployment of social incongruity as the
basis for its intervention has produced a sort of legal orientalism. That is,
it has generated a depiction of law and society in Latin America which is
quite indefensible as pure description: Law is presented as qualitatively
distinct from social relations. In this same vein, Latin America is purported
to be the site of more, and more divergent, legal pluralism than one would
find elsewhere. This strategic portrayal of Latin America, more than just
shoddy empiricism, has a perverse effect. It continually discredits Latin
American legal institutions by calling for a different legal model, projected
and idealized as truer to economic and social realities. Repeated iterations
of these notions as empirical description have lodged these images as a
special peculiarity, or identity, of Latin American law. That is, the
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significant focus and writing on Latin America during the high period of
developmentalism has had a profound influence on commonly-accepted
notions about Latin American law and legal systems. More than at any
other time, U.S. law reviews constructed the picture of a Latin American
legality. Their central images, part of a rhetorical strategy, cemented the
notions of an abnormal, Latin American gap between law and society and
a culturally or socially distinct normativity peculiar to Latin American
peoples.
In this background way, 1960s developmentalism and its aftermath have
structured the politics of law in Latin America for subsequent generations.
Highlighting the dissonance between state law and social practice, as
developmentalists did, has over time entrenched a deep skepticism as to the
relevance and desirability of the former. Specifically, and here one of the
main points of this Essay, it has led to increased disengagement by
progressives with official legal discourse, especially with respect to
struggles over the meaning of legal norms. And, it has skewed debates over
the appropriate mix of regulatory versus informal mechanisms of societal
governance. Progressives are led to advocate automatically and reflexively
for the informal end of the equation, putting all stock in social-based
solutions, understood as reflecting a distinct, identity-based normative
system. By contrast, state law is identified with illegitimate elites and
portrayed as mere ideological cover for the ruling classes. It is argued that
a more effective and appropriate law should take its place--characterized
as a more autochtonous law or, alternatively, modern law, the U.S. legal
model, or transnational law. As such, engagement with state law is
projected as a sterile endeavor, relegated to the ministrations and concerns
of Latin American elites. In its place, attention is drawn to autochtonous
social spheres of normativity or, alternatively, a foreign model. As a result,
questions over informality or non-state intervention in certain areas of the
economy and society are displaced, never taken up as issues of political and
economic interests directly, but rather as matters of essentialist legal
identities outside state law.
The impact of developmentalism was also significant in other
unexpected ways. Clearly, the call for a renegotiation of existing social and
economic arrangements fell on deaf ears among Latin America's legal
traditionalists. They dismissed any such social-based argument and rather,
if anything, cast it as political maneuvering and not serious legal reform.
Responding to this marginalizing move over time, subsequent generations
of progressives have-misdirectedly I argue below-pursued a strategy of
separate but equal systems of legality, with social norms as the source of
such separate systems and the banner for a populist legal politics. This
approach, consisting of an acute emphasis on social practices, a
qualitatively distinct Latin American conception of law, and the idea of
legal particularity across identity groups in the region-taken together,
[Vol. 55
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what I call the hyper-social--can be understood as a product of 1960s
developmentalism. Its persistence as a progressive legal strategy, as well as
its intrinsic marginality, is especially connected to the way in which legal
developmentalism was successfully rebuffed.
The notion of official law's social incongruity, beyond just a formula for
promoting the law-and-development program in the 1960s, has retained a
special appeal in Latin America. Indeed, its general acceptance as
uncontroversial diagnosis, for both the right and the left in legal politics
terms, is a central topic of this Essay. The notion's persistence might, at
first blush, be seen as an open challenge to traditional Latin American
jurists, a constant reminder of the fragility of national legal systems as
against the overwhelming weight of divergent social forces. And indeed,
neo-developmentalists continue to play on this image in just this way.
Images produced by progressives in the 1960s serve just as well to push for
a neoliberal renovation of Latin America's discredited legal systems today;
this time following the logic of the market rather than state-directed growth
and redistribution.
For progressives still operating under this same "development"
framework, the usefulness of this strategy has long come to an end. It has
induced new generations to engage in a prolonged and unfruitful search for
the actual substantive content of Latin American social normativity. Instead
of challenging traditionalist interpretations of official law, and openly
questioning which sectors benefit from informality, demands are premised
on a separate social code, typically posited and sought outside the official
legal realm. Countless efforts have been expended in confirming the
existence and substance of these separate codes. At the same time, the
degree to which the Latin American gap between law and society is greater
than elsewhere is repeatedly accentuated, and the static character and social
irrelevance of state law reinforced.
Official legal discourse, of course, remains central to the distribution and
maintenance of economic, political and social power. It serves as a
significant locus of societal struggle. State law's interpretation and potential
re-conceptualization, even if performed in outwardly opaque fashion, is a
chief mode of social governance. It remains the site for advancing
governance alternatives and cementing existing configurations. It is
constitutive of the economy and society, and most importantly of sectors
remaining outside direct state involvement. Furthermore, its role in
structuring access to the global arena, by local interests and popular forces,
while by no means exclusive, will surely remain considerable. Thus, to the
extent developmentalism has (swayed progressives to abandon their
engagement with official legality, the effect has been to concede significant
power. Freed of such academics and activists, traditional jurists can more
easily dominate legal interpretation. All the while, this dichomotization
reinforces traditionalism's monopoly over official law and its claims to a
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non-politicized legality-and thus to law, tout court. In this connection, a
legacy of 1960s developmentalism is a more undemocratic legal discourse
in Latin America.
The effects mentioned above work a great disservice to the
understanding of law in the region as well as to progressive intervention in
this field. Abandoning official law to the most conservative actors within
Latin America reinforces, if not produces, the very notion of its exclusivity
to elite sectors. Furthermore, normalizing as fact a pathological
disconnection between official law and local society undermines the
legitimacy of law generally within popular consciousness, without any
qualitatively better or less problematic substitute. Social normativity as an
operational system, even if elevated to the rank of official law, cannot avoid
on-going societal struggles over political conservatism, elite monopolies,
and discursive hegemonies. None of these can be magically sidestepped. At
most, social normativity offers a different terrain for these same battles.
Moreover, the social field as deployed by progressives today does not serve
them well. On the contrary, the discredit heaped on national legal systems
has mostly worked to open the door to---or at least make it more difficult
to resist-frequent proposals for transplants of foreign law or foreign
models. While legal imports may not embody a determinate political
valence (either multi-nationals or barrio dwellers might be benefitted in a
particular instance), they typically do deprive local actors of transparent
engagement with the political choices inherent in lawmaking. And, they fail
to solve the proffered problem of legitimacy, said to consist of the current
system of non-participative and mystified lawmaking, by replacing it with
more of the same.
In this Essay, I focus on the ideas about law in Latin America embedded
in law and development scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s. I criticize the
particular way in which these ideas have subsequently been given content.
Additionally, I highlight their impact on legal thinking in and about Latin
America. Finally, I describe alternative ways to conceive of the relationship
between society and law in the region. While a significant body of neo-
development scholarship has been produced in the last two decades, my aim
is not to describe developmentalism over time, but rather to highlight the
particular legacy of its earlier variety and the reactions it provoked in Latin
America.
I. THE 1960S-1970S LAW-AND-DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM
My focus in this Part is to highlight the key ideas of the 1960s and
1970s law-and-development movement. Numerous theories about law's
relation to the economy and to society have been advanced throughout the
past century, including various theories finding favor within Latin America.
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Some of these overlap with the notions identified here.I To the extent they
coincide, this Essay then speaks to potentially multiple intellectual
traditions. However, my line of analysis is U.S. law-and-development.
Different attempts have already been made at articulating its central
paradigm.2 These have mostly focused on identifying the conceptual models
and political forces that influenced developmentalists.3
My approach is quite different. It examines the rhetorical structures used
by development scholars, the images drawn upon, and especially the
framework they offer us for thinking about, and acting in relation to, Latin
American law.4 Rather than characterizing "legal development" as some
sort of system or model (even a highly variegated or multiply-defined one)
in which the central question is its acceptance or rejection (even if this is
considered in light of deeply local variables), I examine legal
developmentalism as a set of argumentative structures, deployed at a
moment in time by a group of legal professionals, to achieve their specific
aims. The latter, simply put, consisted of exporting a part of U.S. legal
discourse under the assumption it would support both economic growth
and social justice.
My objective in this Essay is to highlight the generic legal strategies that
inform developmentalists' "diagnosis" of Latin American law, to note their
1. For example, the "alternative uses of law" movement within the Italian judiciary or the
"Critique du droit" scholars in France, both important in the 1970s, present a number of
complementary ideas about law. The specific contours of these and the uses made of them in Latin
America are, however, subjects for other work.
2. See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID
IN LATIN AMERICA (1980); Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Tamanaha, Book Review and Note Review
Article, 89 AM J. INT'L L. 470 (1995) (reviewing 2 LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL CULTURES
(Anthony Carty ed., 1992) and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul
Paliwala eds., 1993)).
3. See generally GARDNER, supra note 2 (presenting legal development as a system or
model-a U.S. one-which was sought to be transferred to Latin America). Gardner's account
describes the failure of this project on the basis of the inherent vulnerabilites of the U.S. model
and its manipulation "in tropic, authoritarian climates." Id. at 11. Concededly, his account
contains a nuanced description ofthe "model" and an contextualized account of the local, political,
and legal culture. The approach here, however, offers an alternative way of understanding
developmentalism and its failures. It resists characterizations of the development project as the
U.S. legal model, as well as, it resists characterizing its non-favorable reception in Latin America
as the result of Latin American legal or political culture. Instead, I present an account of the actors
within legal and political circles who deploy cultural and legal arguments for and against different
projects.
4. An immediate objection, and a routine one, to the notion "Latin American" or more
specifically "Latin American law" is its imprecision. Indeed, the existence of any such thing is
highly debated. Still, the concept has been used historically, as either referring to the identity of
law in the region or to a particular political project (of course, these two are not by any means
mutually exclusive). The analysis here is intended precisely to dismantle the specific meaning of
"Latin American law" resulting from development scholarship.
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deployment of these arguments as empirical description of law and society
in the region, and to remark on the effect that the continued acceptance of
these ideas, as part of the nature of Latin American law, have on legal
politics within Latin America. As a result, my analysis is concerned more
with development scholarship than with particular projects proposed or
implemented in Latin America. Of course, these are inter-related, as much
of this scholarship describes then current or past projects.
Another focus of my analysis is the reaction of traditional Latin
American legal scholars to the project of developmentalism, as well as the
lasting consequences of the development effort. Accordingly, I draw into
consideration the reactions of Latin American jurists, as active
interlocutors, and not simply as accepting or resisting of foreign aid. The
demise of developmentalism in the 1970s cannot be explained solely in
terms of cuts in assistance funding or political debates occurring in the
United States-although these are important-but depends on the appeal
and receptivity of the project in the legal political context of Latin America.
This is quite different than saying that legal development or that a "U.S.
model" was manipulated by Latin American dictators, thereby causing the
project's failure,5 or that Latin American legal culture is of a different
quality-whether socially or culturally-rendering antiformalism or
pragmatism impracticable. It highlights, instead, how Latin America's legal
intelligentsia reacted to an attempt to change the rules of the game. Law
and development is more important, in Latin America, because of its failure
than because of any significant impact of its programs. And, the end of
developmentalism is meaningful because of the role it played within Latin
American legal politics and because of the impact of its scholarship on
persisting rhetorical constructions.
Law-and-development was, for the most part, a politically progressive
movement within the U.S. legal academy. Riding on the coattails of
development economics, legal developmentalism went hand-in-hand with
reformist approaches to social justice and the redistribution of wealth in
Latin America. Political stability and economic growth were understood as
inter-connected. Achieving both was U.S. policy in the 1960s, an attempt
5. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 5. The author blames the failings of developmentalism
on the shortcomings of the U.S. legal model, but especially on the manipulability of U.S. style
antiformalism in the Latin American context. See id
The analysis in both parts of the volume suggests that the American legal models
carried abroad had built-in flaws and vulnerabilities, and that these surfaced and
were clearly illuminated in the harsh exposure of the Third World. As shown in
the case studies, the American legal models demonstrated a vulnerability to
authoritarian ordering and abuse.
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to counter more revolutionary appeals such as the Cuban Revolution of
1959. Of course, developmentalists can be found in varying stripes." The
movement became quite radicalized at both ends of the spectrum. On the
right, economic progress turned into ajustification for military governments
and the systematic repression of social demands. Pinochet's Chile is a bold
example. It is mostly this version of developmentalism which survived
through the 1980s. Right-wingers ultimately turned to private markets,
instead of the military, as the discipline to produce economic growth. On
the left, the promise of economic development came to be seen as illusory,
the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries more
static and symbiotic than collaborative and evolutionary. Dependency
theory drove these points home.' Today, the progressives that are engaged
in economic development debates work mostly from a defensive posture:
arguing for some continuing role for the state over the market and
highlighting the human toll of an unbridled economic logic.
My portrayal of law-and-development scholarship here draws mostly
from the progressive middle, and from the first wave ofdevelopmentalism,
which constitutes the bulk of writing about Latin America in U.S. law
reviews and reflects the most enduring images. Notably in the 1960s and
1970s, several legal casebooks were published in the United States,
specifically on Latin America.' They contain excerpts from various
development scholars of the period in addition to their authors' own views.
These materials, as well as additional works cited, provide the basis for my
analysis here.
A. Social Theory of Law
In the law-and-development movement, like any area of scholarship, its
participants espoused a range of approaches to scholarship and to legal
6. See id. at 8. Gardner estimates that U.S. $5 million went to Latin American legal
development from a variety of public and private sources, and that approximately fifty American
legal professionals worked in Latin America. Id.
7. See, e.g., ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ANDRI GUNDER FRANK: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
UNDERDEELOPMENT (Sing C. Chew & Robert A. Denemark eds., 1996).
8. See HENRY P. DE VRIES & Jost RODRIGUEZ-NOVAS, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAS (1965)
(containing information mostly on the subject of the Inter-American legal system, but dedicating
a third to descriptions of law in Latin America); KENNETH L. KARST, LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY (1966); KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S.
ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK (1975); JOHN H. MERRYMAN,
THE LAWS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1976) (including some development
writing, however, responding to a very different tradition of scholarship about Latin America and
fitting more traditionally within the project of depicting Latin American law as an extension of
European law, which I have written about elsewhere.). See generally Jorge L. Esquirol, The
Fictions of Latin American Law (Part 1), 1997 UTAH L. REv. 425 (analyzing the role of
"Europeanness" within Latin American law).
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.theory.9 In the main, however, the imprint of social-based approaches is
unmistakable." Many development scholars were contemporaneously
engaged in law-and-society groups, particularly active during that time."
As such, a general description is possible. It is not an exhaustive description
nor can it capture the complexity of any single scholar. Still, it conveys the
most operational ideas of this moment in legal scholarship.
That being said, some brief comments about social theories of law, in
general, are in order. Evidence of the richness of legal theory, sociolegal
discourse in some form is a significant complement to most modem
conceptions of law.'2 While no single generalization captures the variety of
9. See Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 12 (1970)
(arguing that, for the most part. developmentalists had no theory; "when the lawyer goes abroad,
he sails into a vacuum. He takes with him nothing that can reasonably be called a careful, thought
out, explicit theory of law and society or of law and development-nor does he find one at his
destination.").
10. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal
Institutions Help Developing Countries?, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 767, 790.
The precise role of lawyers in a given country emerges from the interaction of a
variety of forces affecting that country, and, therefore, the kinds of roles lawyers
play in national development ought to be viewed as a sociopolitical choice which
each nation must make for itself.... [T]he means towards those ends employed
by lawyers, laws, and legal institutions must be constantly updated to accord with
the specific society, in all its multivarious complexity, and with each intricate,
delicately balanced system of national goals and values.
Id.; see also Dennis 0. Lynch, Review Essay: Hundred Months of Solitude: Myth or Reality in
Law and Development?, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 223, 226 (finding developmentalists'
inspiration in Karl Llewelyn's lawyer as a social engineer: "He [Llewelyn] had an anthropological
view of law, which argued that lawyers andjudges should examine how behavior in actual social
circumstances reflected societal values that should be incorporated into the legal order as working
legal rules to guide future behavior.").
11. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 9, at 53 (stating "[tjhe theory of law and development
is only a special case, or corollary, of the theory of law and society."); Lawrence M. Friedman,
Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 29, 34, 43 (1969) (defining the
"legal system" to mean the living law, "under the influence of external or situational factors,
pressing in from the larger society") [hereinafter Legal Culture]. Friedman considers the
effectiveness of such a system as its ability to process demands for change while maintaining
stability. See id. In this connection, he calls for more empirical study of the legal culture as the
main factor determining effectiveness: "What is the living law of the provinces, or the streets, or
the corporation, in comparison to the law on the books?" Id. at 43; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Law
in Developing Countries, 60 LAW LIBR. J. 13, 16 (1967) (highlighting the unevenness of law's
application in developing countries (based on class membership) as contrary to a "development-
conducive state of mind."). Karst sees law's role in development as principally one of
"legitimating change" needed to effect the social transformations required to apply law equally
to all. See id. at 16.
12. Clearly, sociolegal discourse is also often directed at debates within sociology, generally
speaking. This Essay is limited to considering sociolegal debate within the traditional field of law
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theories on the nexus of law and society, the familiar dualism offers a ready
source of legal authority. It signifies a separate field of societal interaction
whence organic norms can be unearthed. 3 It may also be used to draw into
consideration, within the context of legal decisionmaking, the formal law's
practical effects on society. 4 In both cases, the purported link to popular
society provides an ostensibly democratic justification for its relevance.
Expanding legal decisionmaking, in this way, to include social aspects
enlarges the set of technologies available to legal operators beyond the
traditional modes of conceptualism and deductivism or naturalism and
positivism.
Also significant, social-based theories offer a way to challenge existing
rules or interpretations of rules. An account of prevailing social realities
may, for example, be introduced within legal analysis to argue the obsolete
nature of current legal rules. It may be used in favor of a new policy
direction, arguably more in keeping with societal needs, over others. Or, it
may be used to marshal images of societal ill-adaptedness and thus an
explanation for the failure of conventional legal formulas. Of course, the
method can also be deployed to uphold the underlying legitimacy of
existing laws. Images of society can also be produced to justify the
seamlessness and cultural coincidence of legal norms and societal practices.
Social accounts of law are actually quite standard within most modem legal
systems. As such, they often stand for nothing more than the dominant
understanding. Thus, while social argument can often be an effective tool
and not as a basis for intervention in the social sciences.
13. See, e.g., EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 119-
20 (Walter L. Moll trans., 1936) (defending a theory of social and economic associations as the
basis for legal as well as extra-legal norms). Ehrlich demonstrates how it would be quite
impossible to understand legal rules without reference to this underlying realm of "facts of the
law." Id.
And every new development which arises for new purposes, and which stands the
test of time, is added to the treasure of social norms, and serves to guide later
associations. There is an endless and uninterrupted process of adaptation to new
needs and situations, in which is embodied, at the same time, the development
of the human race and of its norms. It may suffice to instance the great number
of new norms, not only of law, but also of morals, ethical custom, honor, good
manners, tact, and perhaps, at least in a certain sense, etiquette and fashion ....
Id.
14. While both formulations taken together may seem contradictory, in terms of law as
either a dependent or independent variable, Lawrence Friedman describes that even scholars
considering law a secondary aspect of society, such as Marxists, believe that once law acquires
an independent existence, it may exert reflex influence upon the foundation. See Friedman, supra
note 9, at 54.
20031
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for reform, it is just as often part of the legitimating rhetoric of established
positions.
Scholars of the 1960s and 1970s were clearly interested in the question
of development. 5 While the term came to encompass a range of meanings,
key to its understanding was more, and more equitable, economic growth.' 6
Working from the discipline of law, legal developmentalists struggled with
the relationship between economic and other sorts of development and the
legal system.' Convinced that a link existed, they charged aheadwith
projects of legal reform with the objective of promoting economic as well
as political development.'" Their writing about Latin America, the focus of
this Essay, built a consensus of sorts on the ills of then contemporary
systems of Latin American law.' These ideas, sketched out below, inform
most writing about Latin America, and they continue to do so today. They
influence the type of legal reforms often insisted upon by international
organizations and foreign governments for the region. They also condition
15. See Carl A. Auerbach, Legal Development in Developing Countries: The American
Experience, 63 PROC. AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 81 (1969).
16. See Franck, supra note 10, at 772-73 (describing "new" development (the 1960s and
1 970s kind) as interested in social welfare and popular participation; "popular participation makes
for better development than does elitist autocracy-better qualitatively and, ultimately, better
quantitatively."); see also Friedman, supra note 9, at 13-14 (stating, "'[Development' ... refers
to any process of growth or change; and at the same time it means a special kind of favorable
growth, on the model of the so called developed countries.").
17. See Auerbach, supra note 15, at 82 (stating "legal scholarship in our country has
contributed little upon which to build a theory of 'legal development' or to offer advice as to how
legal institutions may be used to foster the modernization process ... legal scholars are beginning
to pay attention to the problem of legal development; those who have worked in developing
nations are reflecting upon their experiences and writing about them"); see also L. Michael Hager,
The Role of Lawyers in Developing Countries, 58 A.B.A. J. 33, 33 (1972) (stating "the neglect of
law in development studies reflects uncertainty as to its ultimate contribution. The question for
some observers is not simply a matter of degree but whether the law is an ally of development or
an enemy.").
18. See Franck, supra note 10, at 788.
Of course, we have recognized the role played by law and lawyers in facilitating
development in the United States. We would also accept the assertion that law
is everywhere an essential instrument of government. But good law aids
development; archaic law hinders it. Good lawyers help, bad lawyers do not.
Id.
19. My use of the term "Latin American law" is subject to much debate. It suggests a
common system of law throughout Latin America or, at a minimum, a view of law's key
characteristics as consisting of transnational similarities. Indeed, facile use of this phrase may
signal complicity in the strategic use of the idea of transnational law, which I attribute to the
dominant Latin American legal discourse (principally by reference to a transnational European
law) and which I have criticized elsewhere. However, my use of the term here simply reflects the
historical fact of the category and attempts to explore the strategic uses to which it has been put.
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the types of projects supported by non-governmental organizations in their
efforts to promote change. Most importantly, they impact the legal
strategies available for progressive positions.
B. Gap Between Law and Society
Developmentalists were in accord that a wide rift existed in Latin
America between state law as enacted and the way people behave.2 ° The
relationship between law and society, law-and-development's central
premise even if not fully understood, thus consisted of a vast disconnection
between the two in Latin America. This discrepancy is central to a range of
scholarship on agrarian reform,2' economic regulation,2 urban squatter
settlements,23 legal aid services,24 legal education,25 and the legal culture.26
20. See Marc Galanter, The Modernization ofLaw, in MODERNIlZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF
GROWTH 153 (Myron Weiner ed., 1966). Galanter-not focusing on Latin America in particular
in this piece-describes the law-and-society shibboleth of a "dualistic legal situation." See id The
innovation is not the discovery of a gap between lawyers' law and popular law (or law in books
and law in action); gaps exist in most systems of law. See id. at 157-58. The interesting point,
according to Galanter, is the particular way which "modern law" attempts to deal with this gap
and the underlying local, legal tradition it evidences. See id. at 158-65. In his estimation, it is to
suppress and replace it: "[o]ur model pictures a machinery for the relentless imposition of
prevailing central rules and procedures over all that is local and parochial and deviant." Id. at 157.
"The law on the books does not represent the attitudes and concerns of the local people.... The
law in operation is always a compromise between lawyers' law and parochial notions of legality."
Id. at 162.
[L~aws were frequently imported from foreign legal systems without
consideration of their appropriateness to Brazilian society, and in a good many
areas, laws are so out of touch with social reality that the society is able to
function at all only by ignoring the law or on the basis of the jeito, a highly prized
national institution for bypassing the formal legal structure.
Keith S. Rosenn, The Reform of Legal Education in Brazil, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251, 254 (1969).
21. See Joseph R. Thome, The Process ofLandReform in Latin America, 1968 Wis. L. REv.
9, 22.
But if the legal system and its institutions are to play an effective role in the
process of reform, then the lawyers who shape its form and susbstance must
become painfully aware of the actual social and economic conditions they would
change. Only then will they realize that traditional legal methods may actually
frustrate the process of reform, and that the legal process, at least in this area,
may have to take strange and unfamiliar but yet effective and equitable forms.
Id.
2t. See Dale B. Furnish, The Hierarchy of Peruvian Laws: Context for Law and
Development, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 91 (1971).
23. See generally Kenneth A. Manaster, The Problem of Urban Squatters in Developing
Countries: Peru, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 23, 61 (praising the 1961 Peruvian Barriadas Law: "The kind
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Without attempting an exhaustive description of all these works, the key
throughout is that official law is out of step with society. A formalistic and
ritualistic legal tradition, based on foreign, European models, is determined
to be a key obstacle to development, if not an outright bulwark of the status
quo. Additionally, the actual social practices of Latin Americans are
presented as reflecting a distinct realm, separate and distinguishable from
state law.
The disconnectedness of law to society was highlighted, within
developmentalist writings, to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of state legal
systems. In their place, a modem law capable of promoting development
was proposed. Developmentalist efforts spanned a broad range, including
both formal and informal strategies. Legislation for agrarian reform
programs and urban settlements was advanced. Antitrust and securities law
regimes were devised. Legal education, especially, was targeted. Some
scholars emphasized the mentality of development. Setting proper
incentives and drawing from local codes of conduct--development from the
bottom-were highlighted. The prominence of the informal sector was
studied. Informality provided a gauge on the motivations and values of
local actors. It was also typically characterized as the by-product or result
of an ill-functioning formal legal sector. A more effective modem law, or
of pragmatic, imaginative adaptation of old legal concepts to new problems which we see in this
law is the kind of first step which Peru and many other countries must take if they wish to begin
to confront the squatter crises effectively, peacefully, and fairly within the framework of legal
systems which are both progressive and just.").
24. See Barry Metzger, Legal Services to the Poor and National Development Objectives,
in COMvITrEE ON LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, LEGAL AID AND
WORLD POVERTY: A SURVEY OF ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA 10 (1974) (stating "the formal
legal systems of most developing nations are derived from Western models imperfectly adapted
to distinctive local conditions. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in the failure of certain laws to
function as intended and in large gaps between popularly accepted behavior and legal norms.").
25. See, e.g., Jorge Witker, Derecho, desarrollo yformaci6njuridica, 24 REVISTA DE LA
FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE Mbxuco 659, 670 (1974) (giving, as an example of the gap between
law and society, the supposition in the law which is "not empirically proven, that the family in
Latin America is structured in general by way of the marriage tie. Sporadic studies of legal
sociology in small communities have detected the existence of a multitude of extra-legal unions,
which lack any legal provision regulating them."). Statements such as these can be made of any
place at any time. The "gap" here is merely an argumentative device, which can in this same
fashion be deployed in most any setting. Here, it is used to argue for a change in legal education
and more social and economic policy-oriented judicial decisionmaking.
26. See Frank Griffith Dawson, Labor Legislation and Social Integration in Guatemala:
1871-1944, 14 AM. J. COMN. L. 124 (1965). Dawson describes how Guatemalan labor legislation
is starkly at odds with Indian goals, values, and traditional hierarchy. See id. Dawson seems to
argue against this destruction of "pluralism" by the state. See id. Indeed, his characterization of
a cruel and oppressive official system makes this point. See id. Yet, in a footnote he states
"[djespite [its] perils, however, the demise of pluralism is to be welcomed." Id. at 142 n.86. For
him, it is in this way that Latin American states will become national societies. See id.
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the promise of it, was by contrast a way of legitimizing the political and
economic proposals advanced by developmentalists."
By contrast, references to social or informal legality encompassed a
variety of different meanings across the range of development writing.
When filling a relatively minor role in specific work, the notion of the social
order generally refers to a source of additional norms, derived from
observable social interactions, social values, and attitudes 28-themselves
derived from morality, 9 religion, community, and other systems of
coercion. ° Under this formulation, the claim is that the formal law does not
satisfactorily describe, and could not describe, the entire legal system."'
27. See, e.g., Legal Culture, supra note II, at 43-44 (stating "[n]o community or group is
truly lawless. But if law is defined as the formal law of the capital or the rulers, then in every
country there are lawless groups and territories .... Pluralism... is not merely a structural
matter. It rests on cultural differences."); see also generally Hager, supra note 17.
28. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst & Norris C. Clement, Legal Institutions and Development:
Lessons from the Mexican Ejido, 16 UCLA L. REV. 281 (1968) (focusing on the specific economic
decisions confronting ejido (community-held land, which is parceled out to individual farmers to
work) members in Mexico and arguing for legal reform, to better secure land tenure, based on the
"small-scale" perspective of the ejido farmer's social and economic constraints). While the authors
recognize the political interests aligned against reform and the legal arguments they invoke, they
do not address them directly or suggest direct engagement to counteract them. See generally id.
Instead, they advance their argument by urging the "small-scale" perspective as better suited to
development. See id. at 302-03.
29. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, Securities Regulation in Developing Countries: The
Brazilian Experience, 52 VA. L. REV. 1283, 1294 (1966) (stating "[t]he developmental purpose
of the program and the gap between business morality and the standards that are necessary for the
existence of mature capital markets create special difficulties in formulating and enforcing these
standards").
30. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Rights in Land and Housing in an Informal Legal System:
The Barrios of Caracas, 19 AM. J. CowP. L. 550, 569 (1971) (describing the customary or
informal law of the urban barrio in Caracas). Karst's analysis is an example of the use of a
separate social sphere as a source of alternative legal norms. See generally id. He argues that
"barrio law" should be considered as official law. See id at 569-70. His argument is explicitly
directed at those, within Venezuela or outside, who believe that barrios are simply an example of
a legal void, where official law has yet to penetrate. See generally id. His rationale is that this
informal, barrio law provides for land tenure stability for urban squatters, which has the effect of
promoting investment in their dwellings and thus promotes development. See id. at 569. Of
course, the official property regime also has the same objective of providing for stability. Solely
on the principle of stability required for development, arguments can be made either for or against
barrio law. In fact, barrio law's purported guarantee of stability is predicated on the government's
decision not to enforce official laws because of political reasons, thereby keeping barrio law and
urban squatters in a precarious position even if they feel secure as a matter of their "state of
mind." According to Karst, however, "the security that is relevant to development is the state of
mind of the developmental decision-maker." Id.
31. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 9, at 29.
[Legal culture] includes all the relevant social values and attitudes that influence
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Simply enough, other criteria must be considered. These may, alternatively,
supplement existing laws, provide for other better rules, or assist in
understanding the causes for official law's breakdown.
In other works of development, the social law plays a larger role. In
these cases, the social field signifies a thickly populated set of autonomous
cultural norms. Qualitatively different from state law, this notion of social
law designates an alternative system more organically connected to the
societal group. 2 Under this formulation, the claim is that social groups hold
such norms irrespective and possibly independent of state law. In its
strongest terms, social law is presented as a potential substitute for the
state.
The scale of legal diversity identified also varies within development
scholarship. It may refer to particular norms of a group or community
within a specific area. Some development and development-paradigm
studies, in fact, focused on systems of normativity within smaller-scale
communities: urban barrio dwellers," rural localities, 4 indigenous
settlements, and others. Alternatively, it may refer to the vastly different
levels of state presence throughout one country or in Latin America as a
whole. In the aggregate, nonetheless, these works offer the picture of a
broadly plural social sphere.
Every Latin American country has a large body offormal
national law on the books-and has had, at least from the
mid-19th Century. Still, the vertical segmentation highlighted
by Wiarda [i.e., "a number ofcorporate elites and intereses "]
persists, stubbornly resisting the establishment of truly
national legal universalism. The moral communities, in other
words, are national communities only with respect to a
relatively limited number of kinds of transactions and
relationships.
A perspective that emphasizesparticipatory development,
however, permits us at least to speculate that a
"horizontally" oriented idea of community may grow at a
grass-roots level, with legal institutions playing their
law but cannot be deduced from its structure and substance. These include
respect for law or the lack of it, whether people readily use their courts, their
officials, or prefer informal ways of solving problems, and attitudes and demands
upon law posed by different ethnic groups, races, religions, occupations and
social classes.
Id.
32. See, e.g., Keith S. Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal
System and its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 514, 515 (1971).
33. See Karst, supra note 30, at 569-70; see generally also Manaster, supra note 23, at 61.
34. Karst & Clement, supra note 28, at 282-302.
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expected role: defining communities, providing channels for
group effort, providing training in cooperation and
leadership."
This diverse society is consistently presented as sharing one commonality,
its radical distinctness from the official legal culture.
C. Arcane and Formalist State Law
In terms of existing law, developmentalism emphasized the
ineffectiveness of Latin American legal systems, alien to the social
particularities of Latin American peoples.36 Rather than emphasize the
multiple and competing governance projects at work in the arena of state
law, drawing on both formalist and antiformalist methodological
discourses,37 developmentalists painted with a broader brush. They depicted
official legality as simultaneously anachronous, malfunctioning, and
marginal. They presented the picture of an unredeemably dysfunctional
legal system, and they drew on a variety of images to do so.
The charge raised by developmentalists has the effect of drawing into
question the conventional repertoire of Latin American legal technologies.
It questions its capacity to represent, and perform, legal decisionmaking in
transparent, rational, and accessible forms. Latin American legal discourse
indeed reflects a relatively complex argumentative style.3" Drawing on
European scholars and foreign models, legal operators frame their
arguments in outwardly circuitous and arcane elocutions. In general, the
dominant mode of legal reasoning advances specific legal positions on the
basis of foreign authorities and legislative developments in Europe and
North America, that is to say, on interpretations of foreign jurists and
characterizations of international developments. This does not mean that
legal argument is necessarily any less strategized nor reflective of particular
local interests. Foreign authorities are sufficiently abundant, and their
interpretations sufficiently pliable, to provide a basis for multiple positions.
35. KARST& ROsENN, supra note 8, at 675 (footnote omitted).
36. See id
37. See, e.g., Rosenn, supra note 32, at 533-34. Rosenn readily accepts that formalism, as
a legal methodology, may be marshaled to frustrate social change; however, he does not recognize
that it can also be the basis for projects of nation-building and even economic development. See
id.
38. See Diego E. L6pez Medina, Comparative Jurisprudence: Reception and Misreading
Transnational Legal Theory in Latin America (2002) (unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation, Harvard
University) (on file with the author) (Demonstrating this complexity, foreign legal authorities must
be marshaled and aligned with an advocate's position. Sources concerned with vastly different
issues and particularities in their own countries must be refitted to provide the rule for the case
at hand. Additionally, the typical legal argument contains a hodge-podge of cites, seeking to win
the battle of foreign authorities.).
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It does raise the question, however, which will be 'discussed further
below, of the outward effects of this dominant mode of legal reasoning.
Even if the array of local political choices may be fully represented, the
need to marshal European precedents or transnational jurists in their
defense may undermine, in the aggregate, a system of democratic law. Law
is mystified by being presented as beyond local agency and individual
objectives. The different outcomes in question are eclipsed by discussions
of foreign jurists. Additionally, certain interests may more easily trump
others absent a more transparent, democratic discourse. The quite
indeterminate discourse ofjuristic authority, paradoxically, makes it easier
to defend idiosyncratic results. Furthermore, allocating societal goods
without reference to social consequences or local equities relieves the
decision-maker of a level of democratic constraints, even if the constraint
is only to craft the decision within the discourse of democratic constraint.
Not so attuned to the intricacies, however, developmentalists mostly
depicted the official Latin American legal systems as a hold-over from
formalism of an earlier era. The legal system was pictured as a relic, not
unlike classical legal formalism at the turn of the twentieth century in the
United States. Albeit, Latin American formalism was understood as
reflecting civilian rather than common law forms. Typical common law
prejudices about civilian legal systems were raised. For example, ideas
about the rigidity of code law and the isolation of the deductive method
from social reality were added to the causes of Latin America's
anachronistic law. 9 Historical narratives were introduced to support claims
of the region's tradition of ineffective legality. The mass of colonial laws
and regulations, unassimilable and contradictory, were used to show the
parallel with contemporary forms.' Sociological narratives, today quite
suspect, were raised to argue the characteristics of societies impacted by
Spanish and Portuguese mores, and thus to explain Latin Americans'
predispositions to circumvent official law.4'
Somewhat understandably, legal technique in Latin America reinforced
this perception. Clearly, legal discourse consisting of citations to foreign
39. See KARST & ROSENN, supra note 8, at 45-47, 61-62.
40. See, e.g., DE VRIES & RODRIGUEZ-NOVAS, supra note 8, at 161-73.
The colonial heritage of Hispanic America with its special techniques of
adjustment to harsh measures persists in the present-day civic irresponsibility,
if not outright evasion of obligations to the community .... The Hispanic
American legal tradition is a blend of formal adherence to representative
democracy and respect for written law isolated from social factors ....
Id. at 168. "[Tjhough the forms of constitutional government have long been present, the
sociological basis for effective implementation of written words is often lacking." Id. at 172.
41. See id. at 161-71.
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jurists and transnational legislative developments recalls an outdated theory
on the nature of law. The notion of Latin American law's foreignness is also
supported by the traditional comparative law scholarship on the region.42
The legal systems of Latin American countries are generally described as
faithful imitations of continental European models. Particularly in terms of
private law, the resemblance between Latin American legal codes and
legislation and their European counterparts is well noted. Continental legal
sources and juristic authorities are understood as the bases of legal
argument within Latin America. Additionally, the United States is generally
recognized as the source of most of the region's constitutional law. These
characterizations of imitativeness or transplantedness are not, however,
intended as criticism. Many comparativists and Latin American jurists, on
the contrary, laud the transnational commonality and, indeed, point to it to
justify the legitimacy and objectivity of the region's laws.
In addition, much comparative scholarship about Latin America
reinforces the idea of the region's official legality as merely a brand of legal
formalism. The eminent, Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen is often presented as
a sufficient and exhaustive description of Latin America's legal
consciousness. Mainstream analyses signal the larger-than-life impact of this
European jurist.43 For many commentators, after citing Kelsen no more
need be said. For them, Kelsen is a shorthand for describing a system of
positive law formalism, essentially a belief in the hierarchical sources of
legal authority-from regulations to statutes to constitutions-and the law
as a relatively autonomous system--the pure theory of law. Kelsen,
coupled with a Spanish, scholastic past often constitutes the extent of
explanation of Latin America's official legality. Its natural law and
deductive logic tradition is simply understood to be updated by reference
to Kelsen's theory of graduated legal sources and the autonomy of law
from other spheres of social life.
Other analyses demonstrate a more varied picture. Despite Kelsen's
great influence, other figures have been instrumental." And, more
importantly, Kelsen himself has been used to stand for many different
propositions and many different interventions within legal argument and
legal politics.45 Attempting to understand Latin American law solely
42. See generally MERRYMAN, supra note 8.
43. See, e.g., Furnish, supra note 22, at 92. Furnish gives pride of place to Hans Kelsen. Id.
He in fact wholly adopts this framework to describe the workings of Peru's administrative law
structure: "The lawyer interested in law and development should follow that trail to see laws in
action, for in Peru and other developing nations the most important source of developmental policy
is the Executive." Id. at 111. Furnish adopts both the "gap" metaphor and the notion of official
law's Kelsenianism at face value. See generally id
44. See, e.g., CARLoS S. NIwo, INTRODUCC16N AL ANALISIS DEL DERECHO (1983).
45. See BORDA KELSEN, EN COLOMBIA (1991).
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through one's view of Kelsen would be unsatisfactory and misleading.
Kelsen does not describe the full workings of Latin American legal systems.
Rather, much legal argument and legal projects citing Kelsen as authority
for myriad propositions are but some of the elements of Latin American
legal reasoning.
In any case, whether or not Latin American law can be
unproblematically characterized as a transplant from other political societies
or the spitting image of Kelsen is part of the same argumentative repertoire.
The affirmative side of the debate, it is worth noting, generally upholds a
view of law as a coherent whole, capable of being transported to different
locations while working in much the same way. Even modified versions of
this point, where foreign laws are said to be adapted to the Latin American
context, reinforce the same notion that law is mostly autonomous of local
actors. By contrast, Latin American law may be understood quite
differently. Its foreign borrowings may respond to different political or
strategic motivations. Use of those materials may be intimately tied to local
interests and cultural politics. Outwardly foreign sources may be used quite
differently and for different reasons in local settings. This debate, however,
makes little sense in the abstract. Both sides are already sufficiently well-
known terrains. Either vision can offer the background scenario for or
against a particular political position within some specific debate."
What is relevant to this discussion, however, is that 1960s/1970s
developmentalists deployed the characterizations of foreignness and
formalism. And, they pressed them as system-wide critiques. The formal
legal system was presented in two ways. It was portrayed as ill-fitting and
anachronous, adrift in stultified European (and old U.S.) models.47 This
imported law was contrasted to the very different lived realities of actual
Latin American peoples. At the same time, official law was identified as
reflective of the interests of a small elite within these countries. This latter
point would seem to show the opposite, its local ties, notwithstanding the
unsurprising fact that the legal system benefits some at the expense of
others. The contradiction, however, is downplayed by the suggestion that
Latin American elites (or those benefitted) are foreign just as well."'
46. At the risk of getting ahead of myself, I simply make a cursory note here: One of the
points of this Essay is that the particular form of traditional legal discourse in Latin America
rejects part of this argumentative repertoire. It reinforces necessitarian univocalism by
disqualifying arguments that openly acknowledge the multiple positions and interpretations
available from traditional legal materials, that is, from citations to foreign jurists and foreign
sources.
47. See, e.g., Dale B. Furnish, Chilean Antitrust Law, 19 AM. J. CoMP. L. 464 (1971)
(decrying the irrelevance of anti-trust laws as a result of Chile's social and economic realities).
48. This point is reinforced by the role ascribed within dependency theory to Latin
America's comprador class, essentially local elites identified with the economically powerful in
the developed world, or unscrupulous intermediaries in the incessant siphoning of wealth from
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In any case, developmentalists criticized the legal system's economic
effects and attributed this to an operational incapacity to align judicial
decisions with national, social, and economic policy. In an era of changing
economic measures, policy enthusiasts were loathe to be frustrated by local
judges. Absent legal decisions aligned with the development consensus,
however, local judiciaries threatened the effective implementation of
national economic objectives. In this regard, the dominant legal
technologies, it was argued, were insufficiently calibrated to assure the
survival of development policies. As such, the technologies were slated for
reform. Developmentalism embraced the prescription of updating Latin
American legal theory.49 Introducing pragmatism to law schools and the
courts, as mentioned already, was the goal. It was assisted by claims of
improving access to the social norms of Latin American peoples; better
reflecting the social realities and cultural identity of the nation; and
embodying the internal conceptions and choices of local society.
Developmentalists-most of them faithful believers in the sociological
underpinnings of law-were quick to demonstrate the influence of society
on law and vice versa. The whole of their project was based on the belief
that development could be engineered through law. Yet, this truism turned
out not to be a belief about all legal systems. Legal systems might be a
product of their societies, and then again they might not. In Latin America,
the sociological truth marshaled by developmentalists was that the legal
system was not."° There, the mass of law was presented as unmoored from
the undeveloped to the developed world. See DAVID LEHMANN, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND RELIOION IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD 20-26 (1990).
In a footnote, Lehman explains "the term seems to have originated in South-East Asia where it
refers to non-indigenous merchant groups with a distinctive ethnic (Chinese, Indian, European)
identity." Id. at 26 n.21.
49. This prescription is not limited to 1960s law and development. Recent writings by the
head of the World Bank's legal division, Ibrahim Shihata, prescribes the same remedy not only
for Latin America but around the world. See, e.g., Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Role of Law in
Business Development, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1577, 1577-78 (1997). Shihata advocates a turn
to legal realism by local judiciaries. See id. at 1581-83. The rationale clearly stated is that realist
judges will be better able to implement national economic goals at the micro level. See id. at 1582-
83.
50. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 2, at 267.
Although there is oversimplification in this analysis of a single and impedimental
role of the exported formal legal system, it illuminates a particular "law-against-
law" conflict, in this case between the formal legal system on the one hand and
the informal law of the society or the instrumental laws of emerging states on the
other. In these conflicts the law and development movement did not find the
formal legal system uniformly on the side of developmental change; on the
contrary, legal formalism again demonstrated a considerable capacity to
complicate social relationships and to delay and inhibit broader social change.
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the mass of society. Depictions of urban barrios, peasant communities, and
other "informal" sectors, by contrast, were used to demonstrate both the
truth of this assertion and, for some scholars, the alternative resources
within society (or informal law) available to development planners,
including economic incentives and goal-setting values of social groups. Of
course, the unproblematic way in which the law-and-society dichotomy was
expressed, as both irreconcilable and necessarily symbiotic, signals the
strategic use made of this formula.
D. Legal Informality as an Argument for Development Politics
The characterization of a gap between law and society is not peculiar to
Latin America nor is this notion particular to law and development. On the
contrary, it is a methodological convention which boasts a long history. The
notion of a different lived experience of the law is highlighted and
instrumentalized for purposes of legal reform. In the Anglo-American
tradition, it is generally attributed to sociological jurisprudence,
spearheaded by Roscoe Pound before World War I. The most common
association with the concept is embodied in the slogan: "law in the books
and law in action."52 According to Morton Horwitz, it was originally
employed for the purpose of criticizing nineteenth and early twentieth
century orthodox legal thought. 3 The underlying notion, that law can
become disconnected from social reality, was also the springboard for
American legal realism.5 4 A more controversial version of progressivism
than sociological jurisprudence," realism had an indelible influence on U.S.
legal thought. In fact, one is hard pressed to describe legal consciousness
Id.
51. See MORTON J. HoRwIrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-71 (1992). Horwitz downplays the controversy typically cited
between sociological jurisprudence and legal realism; on the contrary, he suggests "both
intellectual movements should be understood as sub-categories of pre- and post-World War I
Progressive legal thought, and Legal Realism needs to be seen primarily as a continuation of the
reformist attack on orthodox legal thought." Id. at 171.
52. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
53. See HORWITz, supra note 51, at 188.
54. See id. at 187-88.
55. See id Indeed, it was the very slogan, "law in books and law in action," which became
the target for legal realists in the 1930s. One of the principal figures of American legal realism,
Karl Llewelyn, rose to prominence by critiquing the unfulfilled potential of sociological
jurisprudence to reform the "law in books." See id at 170-82. Pound's handiwork for all its
reformist pedigree and potential had by the 1930s "a tendency toward idealization of some portion
of the status quo at any given time." Id. at 174. Realism, according to Horwitz, presented a real
threat to the then legal system's self-sustaining tropes of principled deduction and legal
objectivity. See id at 187-92. Sociological jurisprudence ultimately became a way to defend the
even-handedness of legal rules by pointing to their source as observable human interaction as
opposed to questionable human logic or doubtful neutrality.
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in this country without reference to its main tenets. For law-and-society
scholars, as direct heirs to realism, "gap" studies were central to their work.
Measuring the relative distance between formal law and societal behavior
was instrumental in calibrating law as a tool of social engineering. It is thus
not surprising that 1960s developmentalists, many of them North
Americans, highlighted the relatively "unrealist" cast of Latin American
legal culture and the wide gap between law and society:
In Latin America, however, governmental administration has,
from the very beginning, been incorporated into the
prevailing system ofpatronage. Nepotism, for example, which
seems almost sinful in the Anglo-American world, is widely
regarded in Latin America as a social duty. Monopoly
privilege is at least as old as the Conquest; Queen Isabella
sought from the outset to limit the exploitation of the New
World to her own subjects-not even to Spaniards generally,
but to subjects of Castile. In Latin America, it is sometimes
said, mercantilism never died Given this history, it has been
argued that the very idea of "rights" in Latin America is
meaningful largely in terms of group privileges, as
distinguished from individual rights. Legal universalism is
thus seen as a dream--and perhaps a North American dream
at that-rather than even a potential reality in Latin
America.6
It is also this "informal" feature which they invested with great
significance." The Director General of the International Labor Office,
Wilfred Jenks, speaking in Costa Rica in 1972, was rather clear about it:
The most renown legal thinkers in Latin America in recent
times, men of the stature of Luis Recasins Siches, Carlos
Cossio y Eduardo Garcia Maynez, have been essentially
philosophers of the tradition ofKelsen rather than architects
and engineers of social change through the legal process in
the fashion of Roscoe Pound There has not been a
contemporary Andrds Bello, with the universal scholarity of
a grand humanist conceiving of law as, essentially, a branch
of the art of statesmanship. What is required are public
figures of their stature in order to place law as an effective
56. See, e.g., KARST & ROSENN, supra note 8, at 639 (footnotes omitted).
57. See, e.g., DE VRIES & RODRIGUEZ-NOVAS, supra note 8, at 193. "Particularly in codes
containing a high proportion of terse, abstract statements of principles rather than detailed rules,
the power to interpret becomes, in practice, the power to create 'law in action."' Id.
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instrument of social change at the center of thought and
practice in Latin America.
This discussion, among other things, highlights the "methods reform"
advanced by legal developmentalists. Methods reform is a shorthand way
of describing a range of proposals advanced by various scholars of this
period. In the aggregate, their proposals not surprisingly suggest emulating
U.S-like legal reasoning.59 Latin American legal operators were urged to
adopt the United States' particular form of legal discourse (or what
developmentalists understood that to be).60 Describing the characteristics
of this latter notion would obviously be the subject for a body of
scholarship in its own right. However, one element of this discourse, which
can be safely asserted, is that there is no, or at least need not be,
overarching theory encompassing all legal reasoning. On the contrary, legal
58. Wilfred Jenks, El derecho yel cambio social en elpensamientoy laprdctica deAmdrica
Latina, in REVISTA DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS 307, 310 (1972) (author's translation). Jenks also
relates that:
In this respect [i.e. providing for change within law as a response to social
conflict], a large measure of change has been produced in the content and
primordial tendencies of Latin American law during the preceding generation.
"Social law" has become a part of unceasingly growing importance in law as a
whole .... So transformed to its social function, [law] enjoys a positive potential
for social change of vast reach, which earlier generations would have doubted
with profound skepticism.
Id. at 313 (author's translation).
59. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 34.
The end result was a law and development movement that lacked many of the
preconditions for direct legal transfer and turned instead to the task--the difficult
task--of indirectly transferring abstract American legal models and concepts that
were neither invited nor imposed, but rather infused, through American legal
assistance.
Id.
60. See, e.g., KARST & ROSENN, supra note 8, at 646.
But in our zeal to be realistic, we should not overlook the obvious and central
fact that an enormous portion of every legal system in the "developed" world is
exceedingly coherent and knowable. (Our own legal education, which still
centers on developing analytical skills, is misleading in this respect, for it
consistently focuses on problem situations, while most transactions and
relationships are "easy cases.") Consider, in contrast, ... Brazil.
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reasoning is, above all else, grounded in local social realities and discrete
policy objectives.
To this end, developmentalists were active in promoting a new
curriculum for Latin American law schools.6 Changing legal methods and
reasoning habits required modifying them at their source.62 Take for
example, Edward Laing, speaking of Colombia:
61. See Rosenn, supra note 20, at 255 n.9 (reflecting on the obstacles to law school reform,
"[i]t may be that something akin to American legal realism cannot thrive in a society where so
many disputes are resolved by extra-legal measures, or where those charged with enforcing the
law are accustomed to reinterpret it without particular regard to statutory language."). Rosenn
construes American legal realism too narrowly. It is precisely these same phenomena that many
legal realists reveal in the U.S. context. Elsewhere, Rosenn notes that "this prevailing attitude
towards law and law study---that it comes hermetically packed like tennis balls and that deductive
analysis is the key to open the can-is at least partly responsible for the great disparity between
law and practice in Brazil." Id. at 272. See Henry J. Steiner, Legal Education andSocio-Economic
Change: Brazilian Perspectives, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 39 (1971); see also Edward A. Laing,
Revolution in Latin American Legal Education: The Colombian Experience, 6 LAWYER AM. 370,
372-73 (1974).
Whether they were the cause or the effect of the tendencies to be presently
described is a matter of speculation. But the Colombian (and the Latin-
American) law school and university helped to produce and perpetuate the class
distinctions and social cleavages which were earlier
mentioned .... Traditionally, therefore, conservatism has been a feature of the
law and society. In law and legal education the tendency has been to stress
historicism and positivism as cardinal features of law, the teaching of which was
designed to produce "jurists" cast in the traditionally exegetical mold by a system
which eschewed intellectualism (unless traditionally endowed) and creativity,
and which extolled professionalism . . . . The system we have described
contributed to professional attitudes resistant to change, the retention of outworn
techniques and to an inward-looking and resilient law school organization and
internal structure, with outmoded curricula and methodologies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
62. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 11, at 19 (stating "[I]awyers in the older of the developing
countries . . . e.g., in Latin America . . . have not been trained in a policy-oriented legal
science .... A radical re-ordering of legal education seems essential to change these patterns of
thought"). See also Thome, supra note 21, at 22.
[If] the legal system and its institutions are to play an effective role in the process
of reform, then the lawyers who shape its form and substance must become
painfully aware of the actual social and economic conditions they would change.
Only then will they realize that traditional legal methods may actually frustrate
the process of reform ....
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The following are illustrations ofthese failings [oftraditional
legal education]: (i) Absence of courses on the social
sciences (and the relation of law to society), on economic law
and on forensic deontology or professional ethics. (ii) Failure
to provide the student with practical exercises and the
opportunity to see law in operation and some of the by-
products of the legal process, such as prisons. (iii) The
disregard ofdecided cases O urisprudencia) in the teaching of
law.6
Additionally, development-minded reformers supported the expansion of
legal services to the poor and public interest litigation.' Beside the direct
benefit in terms of assistance to low-income groups, these services offered
a way to reallocate economic resources by means of the legal system.
II. BRIDGING THE EVER-PRESENT GAP: THE DEVELOPMENT ATTEMPT
One of the paradoxes of Latin American legality is that "social"
argument is not a routine part of mainstream legal discourse. That is,
arguing on the basis of social particularities and perceived realities is not,
in fact, unproblematically available as a legitimate mode of legal
argumentation. Understandably then, attempts at its introduction underlie
the strategy of presenting, emphasizing, and constructing a separate social
or informal sphere of normativity. As it has been configured, however, the
latter course has been and continues to be ineffective to produce change.
To explain, the mainstream conception of law in Latin America (with all
the caveats that such a general reference to very diverse phenomena must
entail) is that answers to legal questions are singular; there is but one
correct response for any legal question under the law. This conception is
supported by a host of different legal theoretical positions and approaches.
Naturalism, positivism, and sociology have all in one way or another been
pressed into service in furtherance of this dominant idea. Moreover,
arguments premised on other than accepted legal materials are deemed
illegitimate and inapposite as legal reasoning. As such, it is understandable
63. Laing, supra note 61, at 374 (footnotes omitted).
64. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 7.
Except under the most exceptional circumstances, an effective legal services
program can contribute only marginally to eliminating the economic poverty of
lower-income groups. Its contribution is more toward distributive
justice-toward the nondiscriminatory operation of institutions with which
citizens deal-which is increasingly being recognized as a development goal
complementary to but independent of economic development.
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that different waves of social reformers have sought to position "social
reality" as an alternative source of law and to insist on the formulation of
rules that follow its recognition. Such an argumentative move re-
conceptualizes legality as plural, that is, of permitting potentially multiple
solutions under potentially multiple presentations of social reality.
This characterization is not intended to describe an essential quality of
law in Latin America. Surely, law and legal discourse are the product of the
motivations and idiosyncracies of its participants. Throughout Latin
America, these are mostly organized at the national level. As such, this
Essay admittedly presents broad ideas and hypotheses calling to be enriched
by more detailed accounts of country-specific or even community-specific
usages. Still, past political projects mobilizing the conception of a unified
Latin American legal identity (either as explicitly Latin American or
essentially European) have had an impact on legal discourse throughout the
region. It is the collective impact of these projects which is described here
as a common element and thus renders it sensical to discuss on a regional
level of analysis. It depends on nothing other than the historical fact of
"Latin American" (or European) identity-based projects pursued in law.
Thus, this description of a Latin America-wide state of affairs is neither an
attempt to reinforce some past identity project nor does it seek to mobilize
a new identity characterization of its own. Rather, it describes the
commonalities produced historically by the advancing by some, and
resisting by others, of projects of transnationality. A by-product of those
struggles, and achievement of those emerging victorious, happens to be the
rejection of social-based legal argument. Mainstream Latin American
jurisprudence, thus, has consistently drawn a sharp line between law and
politics, and placed social argument firmly within the latter camp. In this
discursive economy, social argument is the antithesis of law. It threatens the
above-politics authority of legal rules. Curiously, a wide spectrum of legal
politics has effectively acquiesced in this state of affairs. As such,
consolidating the social realm as a source of law remains an activity
relegated to the margins, if not completely outside, of national legal
discourse. Characterized as political discourse, it is rejected by mainstream
jurists. As such, the tried and true method of legal renewal through
invoking social considerations is rendered ineffective.
In this light, the inordinate efforts of progressive scholars of the social,
in particular, become more understandable. In the face of a legal culture
apparently impervious to transformation on the basis of social needs, the
strategy has been to redouble efforts. The exclusion heightens the
motivation to defend and construct a separate social sphere, as a concrete
sociological reality, to render it undeniable for arguing for legal reform. The
gap between law and society is magnified and the coherence of a separate
sphere of social normativity is re-emphasized. Thus, in order to make way
for quite conventional social arguments, many progressives have dedicated
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themselves to the vast enterprise of defending social altemity. Identifying
and making concrete the potential of a social source of norms offers the
hope of strengthening their hand. Real transformation, however, seems
always postponed until the social is sufficiently articulated, through
empirical study, sociological research, or maybe only after a revolution.
This state of affairs within Latin American legal culture is indeed
problematic. Instead of a routine use of social-based argument within
national legal discourse, this technique has been rendered for the most part
unavailable or illegitimate. Clearly, social argument is not new (it was not
new in the 1960s) nor is it a deeply counter-institutional mode of legal
argument, often quite the contrary. Yet, its deployment in Latin America,
as a reforming catalyst against traditionalism within the official legal system,
has not worked. This apparent unavailability of the social, however, is no
more an intrinsic particularity of Latin American legal systems than is the
figure of a lawless gap between state normativity and social conduct.
Historical accounts demonstrate that Latin America is not immune to
cross-national currents in legal theory. Latin American jurists provide
testamentary proof ofthe pervasive influence in the region of social theories
in scholarship as well as decision-making. Yet, there is admittedly a
perceived absence of social argument within Latin American legal
reasoning. It is deeply eclipsed, and when it is raised, it is quickly
challenged as illegitimate. Additionally, this is not a result of a time lag in
general jurisprudence--such as a movie that might not have yet reached our
southern neighbors. Quite differently, the arrival of social argument in law
is not late but, rather, has been repeatedly re-inscribed as an innocuous
reaffirmation of the existing legal system or as a political question to be
kept off the table. Thus, its reformist, transformative potential has been
repeatedly blunted.
Nonetheless, this same strategy of calling on the social, employed by
law-and-development scholars, continues to be relaunched and given new
life by subsequent generations of progressive scholars.65 As it has been
65. As noted earlier, taking up other historical examples of this phenomenon is beyond the
scope of this Essay. However, by way of brief reference, Wanda Capeller tells the story of French
"Critique du Droit' influence in the late 1970s in Latin America, in the way suggested by the
analysis here. See generally Wanda de Lemos Capeller, Entre o ceticismo e a utopia: A sociologia
juridica latino-americanafrente ao debate europeu, in SOCiOLOGIAJURIDICA EN AMLmCALATINA
(1991). Capeller identifies military dictatorships in the 1970s with legal formalism (just as
developmentalists did with then existing legal regimes), subsequently challenged by critics,
deploying "Critique du Droit," who saw the French ideas as an "'ideological option' in opposition
to North American theoretical models." (Rather than legal realism, they wandered toward
materialism.) See id. Still, its proponents failed, according to Capeller, because of insufficient
connection with social research and social reality, making it impossible to effectuate any real
transformation (reinforcing the subsequent move by progressives toward the hyper-social,
discussed below in text). Id. at 94-95.
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given shape, it consists ofproj ecting and defending a qualitatively different
and dense field of social particularity from which to argue for change, a
field of social reality and difference that cannot be denied, which is what I
call the hyper-social. Consequently, it entails arguing an ever bigger and
deeper gap between law and society. Law-and-development's rejection by
Latin American traditionalists, however, has already marked the marginality
of this enterprise. Specifically, the defenses and arguments raised against
methods reform in the 1970s, inscribed this antiformalist, progressive
strategy as non-legal discourse. Indeed, the way this skirmish took place,
discussed below, helps to explain the current state of play of Latin
American legal politics.
In passing, I have referred to neo-developmentalism in Latin America.
Direct heirs to the tradition of social-legal duality, these newer reformers
employ essentially the same ideas and strategies to promote a market-
oriented overhaul of the legal system. They respond to the objections, the
same ones directed at 1960s developmentalism, by differentiating their
approach. Objective economic incentives and market logic, it is argued,
guide their efforts and thus, it is claimed, are not as easily manipulable as
social engineering and political redistribution goals. Furthermore, neo-
developmentalists defend their agenda as the product of collaboration with
and consent by Latin Americans. With theses explanations, the new wave
of developmentalists are satisfied to pick up where past efforts left off-if
not with the same content at least with the same overall analysis and
framework.
My concern here, though, rather than tracing the impact of neo-
developmentalism and discussing its parameters, is the impact on
progressive legal politics remaining in the wake of earlier
developmentalism. In this connection, the specific ways in which
developmentalism was rebutted in Latin America are important.
III. ROLLING UP THE BRIDGES (ACROSS THE GAP)
Aligning the law with economic development and social justice was not
in the abstract very controversial. Latin American leaders were anxious to
receive the new technologies associated with modernization. Especially in
the areas of law and economics and business law, Latin American
professionals were eager to tool up. Latin American jurists as well were
enthusiastic about the renewed attention and resources targeted to legal
institutions. The year 1959 marked the first of five regional conferences of
Latin American law schools to reconsider their curriculum." While framed
66. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 56 (confirming that the first conference in Mexico City
consisted of more than two hundred and fifty Latin American delegates from forty law schools in
eighteen countries, with no North Americans in attendance).
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in broad and somewhat vague terms, the need to adjust law to its social
setting was an articulated goal.67 The value of these conferences, according
to Edward Laing, lay in "the spiritual coming together and the widening of
horizons [, and these] were worthwhile achievements notwithstanding the
'flagrant discordance' between the accords of the conferences and their
application in each law school."68 Yet, the division between reformers and
traditionalists was quite plain. In a prepared presentation for a subsequent
Latin American law school conference, scheduled in Argentina but not held,
Hdctor Fix-Zamudio traced the dividing lines:
Due to this traditional exaggeration of our exclusively
theoretical juridical studies, a path is opening among Latin
American treatise writers worried about the abuses of
"dogmatism," [demonstrating] an inclination for the so-
called "empirical" studies, following the example of a sector
ofAnglo-American treatise writers, especially those from the
United States, who have signaled the need to reduce the
predominance of those labeled pejoratively as
"bookteachers. ,69
The 1960s and 1970s also saw much localized, national interest and debate
on reforming legal education, such as in Argentina, Brazil, 0 Chile,
67. See Laing, supra note 61, at 379. Laing highlights the following points:
[E]merging from the first conference was the recommendation, made in
connection with curricula suggestions, that legal education should be adjusted to
the social needs of the community and be related to its needs and those of the rest
of Latin America. This was repeated at the third conference, while the fourth
conference suggested some specific programs for law schools to follow in
fostering the social and economic welfare of the community and its members [for
example, free legal assistance and centers for legal information].
ld; see also H6ctor Fix-Zamudio, Docencia en lasfacultades de derecho, 3 BOLETIN DEL COLEGIO
DE ABOGADOS DE M]axico 2 (1973).
68. See Laing, supra note 61, at 382.
For its basic activities ARED [national Colombian association for legal education
reform] has received some financial assistance from the Ford
Foundation.... Despite the fact that these, and other activities could only have
been beneficial, there has been some reluctance of other law schools to join
ARED, and teachers using the modem methodologies have experienced
considerable student resistance and been accused of brainwashing and conducting
unwholesome Yankee practices.
Id. at 387-88.
69. Fix-Zamudio, supra note 67, at 15 (author's translation).
70. See, e.g., Cludio Souto, Sociology of Law: A New Perspective in Brazilian Legal
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712Colombia,7' Peru, and various Central American states.' In short, the
political environment offered an opening for reform. Furthermore,
developmentalism was supported by a worldwide focus on issues of
economic progress and the backing of powerful international agencies and
their resources. Not surprisingly, Latin American legal operators were
receptive. Indeed, there was a ready segment of Latin American reformers,
as evidenced by the regional and national conferences on Latin American
legal education, whose agenda developmentalists directly reinforced.73
Education, 1972 ARCHlV FEUR RECTHs UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 237 (1972). Souto describes the
introduction of sociology of law courses and an institute at the University of Recife law school.
See generally id. He credits William D. Macdonald of the University of Florida College of Law
with the following. Id. at 243.
The more general and important of these applied studies [within the institute]
was research initiated . . . under a topic suggested by William D.
Macdonald ...[which] attempts mainly to survey opportunities for socio-
juridical research in connection with the reform of Brazilian
legislation--opportunities for research that could or should be carried out
whether before or after the new codes are put into effect.
Id. at 243. Souto was interested in framing a qualitative definition of the "living law" (beyond the
quantitative "high-frequency behavior") which could form the basis for
the expansion of societies and of their problems of sociability, the increase of
internal and external communication, the needs of international life. All this
seems to demand a type of social control capable of adaptation to our modem
society: a social control less formal and less dogmatic and more flexible, more
dynamic, corresponding to the rapid change of the particular societies and the
nature of the international society, which remains, to a great extent, an informal
one.
Id. at 245.
71. See Laing, supra note 61, at 383.
72. Id.; see, e.g., Mario Quift6nez Amdzquita, El estudio del derecho y sus metodos de
enseganza, I BOLETINDEL COLEGIODEABOGADOSDEGUATEMALA 2, at 4, 16 (1974) ("[P]odemos
afirmar que son las Facultades de derecho las mhs conservadoras y reacias a la implementaci6n
de reformas .... Nosotros hemos considerado que Guatemala necesita un abogado con miras al
desarrollo, que conozca el Derecho de su pals, la realidad del mismo."); Antonio Vivanco,
Ensefanza e Investigacidn en el Derecho Agrario, I REVISTA JURIDICA DEL PER0 151 (1974).
73. Of course, it is not clear how far Latin American-based reformers were willing to go.
The words of a leading figure in legal education in Colombia, Dr. Fernando Hinestrosa of the
Extemado de Colombia, leaves room for doubt, stating that law is
not simply a science or a mere technique, nor speculative knowledge, nor a
vulgar method of doing things. But, as in its classical Roman ancestry, Law
continued to be an art and, require[d] a solid theoretical conception, a simple and
direct method of reasoning and decision and an universal criterion, with a clear
humanist flavor ....
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
While the formula-essentially antiformalism-was not new to Latin
America, developmentalists had their 9wn way of articulating it.74 An
emphasis on policy, pragmatism, and realism was surely a new turn within
Latin American legal discourse. Yet, it was no more than old wine in new
bottles. It represented a challenge to dominant legal discourse in much the
same way that other social-based efforts had attempted in the past. It did
so, specifically, by drawing authority from social and economic imperatives
and proposing different legal arrangements to attain them.
In any case, defenders of the traditional system did not wait long to
react." The potential of non-traditional argument as proposed by
developmentalists was soon undone.76 One mode of rejecting reform and
supporting traditionalism was to emphasize the importance of Roman law
to the Latin American legal curriculum." Roman law is still a basic,
Laing, supra note 61, at 386. Then again, legal mystification is not necessarily a proxy for lack
of reformist intent.
74. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 57-58.
The American legal assistance programs which later emerged had little apparent
memory or knowledge of the Latin American reform endeavor-a striking
omission in the American law and development literature on Latin America in
the early and middle 1960s, and an instructive comment on the American origins
of the reforms subsequently launched.
Id.
75. See, e.g., id. at 62-63 (describing the resistance in Brazil to legal education reform,
where an independent center in 1965 was created "largely because the Brazilian law schools were,
in fact, unreceptive to American notions of reform....").
76. A quite theoretical treatment of the tensions presented is the work of Eduardo Garcia
Miynez of Mexico. Eduardo Garcia Mfynez, El derecho en el order del ser y como sector del
orden social, 19 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE Mtx=CO 525 (1969). Garcia Miynez
reinforces the traditional conception of law, and argues against "psychological" or "legal
consciousness" ideas about legality, in the following way. See generally id.
In other words, the execution of acts of consciousness in an individual or a
plurality of subjects does not constitute, rather it confirms or recognizes legal
objects. There is no doubt that the existence of these is found in the
psychological ambit, in conscience and individual feeling, but it does not depend
on such connection, nor is it limited by it.
Id. at 528 (author's translation). Garcia Miynez grounds law in the social order, but for him the
social order fixes the minimum requirements for co-existence. It is inter-subjective, rather than
collective, yet rises above individual will. When participating in society, individuals submit their
individuality to its pre-existing dictates. As such, in his work, the social order is not a source for
substantial change, rather it is already present and the source of existing legal rules.
77. See, e.g., Maria do Socorro Bezerra da Costa et al., Atualieazdo do ensino do direito
romano, 23 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MtXICO 53 (1973).
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required course within most Latin American law schools. The course is
generally offered over a full year, and possibly more than any other
discipline firmly propounds the membership of Latin American legal
systems within the family of a European transnational law-the mainstay
of legal legitimation in Latin America.71 In 1967, the first Inter-American
Congress on Roman Law was held in Jolo Pessoa, Brazil 7 9 -in effect, the
counter-conference to those mentioned above, targeting "pragmatic"
curricular reform. A few years later in 1973, at another such event, Cdsar
Josd Ramos Sojo of the Universidad Central de Venezuela captured the
sentiment of these meetings:
It is also worthwhile to observe that the crisis in higher
education is part of a more general crisis of culture. It is not
so much a determinate discipline which is questioned, but
rather the proper finality of studies imparted, the values that
until now have been represented, the concrete ideal which is
sought to be created
In what concerns the studies of Law, we see widely
disseminated the persuasion that the interest lies informing,
along the way more able manipulators of procedures and
competent drafters of acts and legal documents. It is then, as
a logical consequence, that Roman law and other disciplines
are not appreciated within such conception of scholastic
education.
In no instance should the importance and utility of the study of Roman law be
placed in doubt, as it has come to conform a true legal consciousness through
above all legislation and case law. It is valid to consider it not a dead law that
should be forgotten. It is a living law, acting, and impregnating o amago as the
essence of other Laws.
Id See also Cdsar Josd Ramos Sojo, Necesidad de una actualizaci6n de la ensehanza del derecho
romano, 23 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE Maxico 67 (1973). The author argues that
[tihe frequency with which we find the questioning of the modem study and
teaching of Roman law, inside and out of law schools, could have us believe that
it is a phenomenon exclusively of our times. As well it has been observed about
France, this attitude is more than 200 years old. . . . Notwithstanding this
observation by Accarias ("Roman law courses... are in actuality rejected by
students and attacked by reason of an undue suspicion by part of the peoples of
the world.") the study and teaching of Roman law was conserved in the
curriculum of studies of Roman law in France, without transcendental reform.
And what is valid for France, can be said as well for our countries.
Id. at 67-68 (author's translation).
78. See Esquirol, supra note 8, at 427 n.2, 431-32 n.14.
79. See Bezcrra de Costa et al., supra note 77.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
From this cannot be excluded the utilitarianism of many
who register at law schools. According to the pragmatism, by
them maintained, only what can be translated into economic
gain and purchasing power should be the object of study, fast
and easy, within professional practice. For them, creative
activity, the attainment of order and the intuition of the
normative, [and] the social mission of the jurist of condere et
interpretare ius do not matter.80
Also, for example, Nina Ponnsa de la Vega de Miguens from Argentina
argues in the same symposium proceedings, published by the Universidad
Aut6noma de Mexico Law Review:
Other specialties, like for example sociology and
economics, approach their study with a prospective criterion
and projections toward the future. The mental training of
those that think in law is moved by the present and by an
objective field which is at the same time axiomatic, with the
concern to know and obtain juridical values whose nucleus is
justice .... Roman jurisprudence has meant an always
current truth, applied today in different fields of law .... It
is evident that legal education has as its principal end to
configure the mentality and way of thinking, in such a way
that the student acquires a certain logico-juridical habit that
is adapted to the normative system of his time .... It is
desirable the fact that the study of Roman jurisprudence be
every day more extensive and deep, despite that its learning
require the study of rules and prescriptions that are
frequentlypermitted and inapplicable in actuality. Its specific
objective is the training ofscientificjurisconsults armed with
a special and necessary logic for the interpretation and
application oflaws, which is acquiredfundamentally through
the jurisprudence of the Romans.81
Other approaches and theoretical frameworks were also marshaled against
substantial curricular reform-essentially arguing against changing the
"European" identity of Latin American law. 2 The new methods, to the
extent they were actually introduced, were quickly undermined.83 Their lack
80. Sojo, supra note 77, at 70.
81. Nina Ponnsa de la Vega de Miguens, Necesidad de una actualizacidn en la ensefanza
del derecho romano, 23 REVISTA DEL A FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE Mexco 21, 22-23, 25 (1973)
(author's translation).
82. Cf Victor Tau Anzoftegui, Importancday estado actual de la enseflanza de la Historia
del Derecho, 130 REViSTA JURIDICA ARGENTINA "LA LEY" 976 (1968).
83. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 2, at 83.
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of success has been attributed, by certain scholars, to insufficient resources
and unsustained attention directed at curricular change; and lethargy and
inertia, or both, on the part of Latin American legal professionals and law
students." Yet, considering that legal developmentalism's main product
was conceptual (an idea about the nature of law and its application), its
open resistance by Latin America's legal mainstream and the discursive
forms this took, I maintain, is a significant part of the explanation.
Dominant Latin American jurists and defenders of the traditional order
rejected the developmentalist opening and its democratizing potential.85
Introducing new variables within legal reasoning would, at a minimum,
require a different way of justifying settled divisions of power and
distributions of resources within society. Developmentalist methods,
moreover, might go further. They could disrupt the long-settled
accommodations reached by the legal system. Accepting policies such as
the then widely-touted goals of economic progress and social equity, as
Opposition surfaced [at PUC in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], for example, in the form
of persistent faculty criticism that the new reform program--especially the
Development Law branch-was not law but social science. Eventually, after
intense intrafaculty struggles, the CEPED group and the dean were replaced by
a dean in the more traditional and conservative mold.
Id.
84. See, e.g., id. at 231-35.
85. See, e.g., Francisco Serrano Migall6n, El derechoyla ley, 5 EL FORo 53 (1969) (arguing
that order is not a social norm, rather order is the goal of state law, as opposed to ideal justice or
the common, social good). In his view, state law can only achieve some rough measure of the ideal
ofjustice while providing peace for society to pursue its common good. Absent law, "una sociedad
sin orden serla un mundo donde reinase como 6nica Ley el bajo instinto del egoYsmo y las insanas
pasiones humanas." Id. at 54. But cf, Ambrosio Romero Carranza, A los cincuenta atlos de la
creacidn de una cdtedra de derecho, 1973JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA: DOCTRINA 287, 287
(arguing against the tendency in Argentine law schools to marginalize the study of political law;
"[e]n la actualidad el conocimiento del derecho politico se ha impuesto come una necesidad
urgente e indispensable para el progreso de la vida social"); see also Sojo, supra note 77, at 77-78.
It is necessary to safeguard against the iconoclastic current of breaking all links
with the legal tradition in which we are inserted and which signals our common
destiny, Kischaker highlighted the contribution of Roman law in Europe, its
active participation as a constructive, harmonious and pacific element, of the sole
city, beyond national differences. Codifications of the French, Italian, and
German type, as works of Romanists, reveal the phenomenon of a common
descent and a common place of understanding. The codifications derived from
the same cannot be subtracted from the influence of Roman law which remains
the fundamental juridical datum, at the base of our social organization, a factor
of unity.
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part of legal decisionmaking, could open to renegotiation the old bargains
struck. The lurch to the left, represented by dependency theory's critiques
of the development model,86 further exacerbated the perceived dangers of
a substantial renegotiation, under the mantle of a "periphery-centered"
development.
In order to derail this possibility, traditional legal operators emphasized
the dangers of instrumentalism." Policy, rule-skepticism, and antiformalism
were all tarred with the same defect: legitimating arbitrary laws. The focus
on policy and social reality was associated with unlimited deference to the
government in power.8 To sharpen the point, following this thinking, in a
left-wing government antiformalism means the end of private property and
the rule of law; in a military dictatorship, it means repressive norms of
social control and autocratically-derived public policies. 9 By interpreting
development methods as leading to these results, traditional jurists called
upon the fears of political extremism; the new methods could just as easily
legitimate arbitrary state action by undemocratic governments.
Traditionalists sought refuge in their conventional role as defenders of
the status quo, containing the unruly masses on the one hand and
restraining autocratic leaders on the other. The balance was maintained,
however, by defending against any deep transformation of the existing
86. See ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR REVOLUTION
(1969).
87. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 117.
When, therefore, the OAB [Brazilian Bar Association] president, Faoro,
discussed "formalism" and "instrumentalism," he in effect turned the legal
models of American legal assistance inside out. Rather than criticize legal
formalism as antiquated, for example, the movement perceived in legal
formalism the "dorsal fin" of liberal constitutionalism. Rather than encourage
rule skepticim and state instrumental law, the movement advocated formal rules
and the rule of law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
88. An interesting example is the reaction of the Chilean Supreme Court to the legal
interpretations espoused by the Allende administration in the early 1970s. A significant amount
has already been written about the Chilean Court's exceptionally activist stance and consequent
de-legitimation of legally valid, yet non-traditionally interpreted and applied, governmental
programs and enforcement actions. But see Velasco, The Allende Regime in Chile: An Historical
Analysis 9 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 480 (1975-76) (sustaining that Allende's actions were illegal, if not
in the letter, in the spirit of the law, thereby precipitating the Court's justifiable stance); Neal
Panish, Chile UnderAllende and the Decline of the Judiciary, 9 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 693
(1987) (also attributing the Court's actions to Allende's violation of the separation of powers
doctrine).
89. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WiS. L. REv.
1062, 1070-84.
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order. Social-based legal argument presented such a potential disruption,
upsetting the balance enshrined by conventional legal reasoning.
Accordingly, traditional jurists helped rechannel, defeat, or otherwise dis-
able the transformative potential of this legal technology. The specific
outcome of a development-inspired attempt at transformation in the 1960s
and 1970s is significantly illustrative of this occurrence.
Developmentalists, on their part, allowed themselves to be cowed.
Faced with the very real abuses of political extremists at the time, it
appeared Latin America was not ready for policy or pragmatic legal
decisionmaking.9 ° At least it was not so at the cost of reducing democracy
or progressive aims. Take for example James Gardner's "terminal" review
of the Brazilian legal education reform project presented to the Ford
Foundation in 1973:
[Tihe core ofthis conceptualization [producing more activist
and socially aware lawyers and a more humanistic approach]
may become very tenuous if law has, by the very essence of its
being, an enduring affinity for the status quo, and if lawyers,
by their class background, training, professional
reinforcement, etc., are among the more persistent agents of
the status quo ; ... Stated baldly: even to the extent that [the
grant] did succeed, it may have simply trained up more
effective agents of the status quo, and strepgthened the
institutions which train these agents.9'
Even worse, faced with the possibility of supporting dictators or Marxist
regimes, developmentalists pulled their own plug.' Even an insightful and
critical scholar such as Gardner, cited above, fell into the belief that
American legal assistance and repressive, state instrumentalism were
indistinguishable:
90. See generally PANISH, supra note 88. Panish retreats into "separation of powers"
formalism when confronted with a politically-controversial, and for some, unbridled Chilean
pragmatism. See id.
91. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 80-81 (quoting his own report) (second alteration in
original).
92. See Bilder & Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 474. The authors discuss the practical end of
law and development funding and scholarship after deep doubts were expressed within the U.S.
legal academy about exporting instrumental approaches towards law to authoritarian Latin
American governments. Id. "Trubek and Galanter did not, however, offer any suggestions about
what should replace the Western model." Id. I agree with the authors' views on the error of
imploding law and development but for very different reasons. The authors argue that its demise
was a result of purely "homegrown" U.S. political reasons-the Vietnam War, distrust in
government, and the rise of the critical legal studies movement. See id. at 474-76. They, however,
underestimate the impact and resistance of powerful sectors of Latin American societies and legal
intelligentsia to development-based reforms and to the politics of its proponents. See id.
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In summary, well before the arrival of American legal
assistance and the establishment of CEPED [the institutional
vehicle for legal education reform] in Brazil, that country's
governing technocracy had accepted much of CEPED 's basic
perception of law: that formal, doctrinal law is antiquated
and is an impediment to development, and that instrumental
law is modern and is an important vehicle for social control
and social engineering. The governing technocracy [an
authoritarian military government] had started the public
sector on a forced march to state instrumentalism .... And
the Brazilian legal profession, as discussed above, was
bypassed and generally confused by, and attempted to catch
up with, this major jursiprudential change. American legal
assistance was not the "cause" ofthis fundamental breach in
Brazil's traditional legal culture, of course .... It was
precisely this emerging public sector instrumentalism that
conditioned much ofthe receptiveness to CEPED 's American
jurisprudential models.9 3
Developmentalists especially came to see it this way, if they understood
their own project as simply getting law out of the way of the
developmentalist state. Up against an obstructionist Latin American legal
class resiting developmental policy, their notions of pragamatism,
antiformalism, and instrumentalism, which were intended to overcome the
resistance, became conflated with simply legitimating state action.94 Their
objectives were limited to undoing the separate authority of the traditional
legal profession to speak exclusively for the law, rather than providing an
alternative legal discourse capable of differentiating between different types
of state action. In the belief that the developmentalist state would do the
right thing, advocating the legality of its actions was a logical way to align
law with development. Once Latin American governments were perceived
as not doing the right thing, however, the strategy of undoing the
obstructionist power of the legal profession came to be seen as
wrongheaded. The backpedaling that marked the end ofdevelopmentalism
contributed especially to reinforcing-in legal discourse terms-the
connection between the independent authority of the legal profession and
93. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 98-99.
94. See Dennis 0. Lynch, supra note 10. In Lynch's review of Gardner's book, one criticism
stand out: Gardner's failure to distinguish between positivism and naturalism within Latin
American legal formalism, and his failure to differentiate between instrumentalism and
pragmatism within North American realism. As a result of this confusion, formalism as natural
law thinking appears to offer a basis for resisting authoritarian government decrees:
developmentalism as merely instrumentalism appears to offer no brakes.
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traditionalist legal positions, the latter consisting of a narrow and
undemocratic conceptualization of law as necessitarian and univocal.
In any case, the whole legal development project was thus drawn into
question. In fact, public self-questioning and self-doubt ultimately prompted
the main U.S. and international agencies to withdraw their support. Faced
with the choice of either accepting the traditional political settlement under
the existing legal system or potentially offering legitimacy to political
extremes, they chose the former. This formulation of the options, however,
presents a false dilemma. While pragmatism and policy can surely serve as
handmaidens of authoritarianism, this discovery does not undermine its
ability to articulate critiques or to stand as alternative law supported by the
legal class, as a sustainable national legal discourse. Furthermore, in this
same way, legal formalism can offer a basis for resisting state action, yet it
can also be a singularly effective basis forjustifying repression. In any case,
developmentalists backed away. They were daunted by the traditionalist
stranglehold on the conception of law and by their own dualistic depictions
of Latin American legality.
As such, developmentalism was shown incapable of providing
safeguards against political extremism, the same objection raised against
state instrumentalism. Developmentalists seemed to agree that the new
methods were in fact prone to legitimating arbitrary action, failing to
differentiate among different projects in policy pragmatist terms. Notably,
no effective opposition to state authoritarianism was conceived of, if the
multiple character of law were to be acknowledged openly.95 The only
95. Seeid. at ll8.
IT]he legal engineer and legal instrumental models were in fact engaged as the
agents and the instruments of the state, and the models provided no coherent
basis for criticism of, or resistance to, an authoritarian state. For this resistance
the lawyers-Brazilian and American--turned to the formal legal tradition and
the rule of law.
Id. About Chile, Gardner asserts
[t]he low point [of the legal instrumentalism model as supported by U.S. legal
assistance] involved extralegal social action, encouraged by the state, as part of
a larger pattern of coercive engineering, beyond the reach of legislative
authorization, to force owners to transfer farms or businesses to the state sector.
In that situation the already blurred line between "law" and "policy" faded to
extinction, purposeful instrumentalism readily became state engineering beyond
the reach of legal instruments and judicial review, and the process, if unchecked
by legal or political institutions, became little distinguishable from raw state
power. In Chile, then, underlying instrumental models again demonstrated a
persistent affinity for policy and power-and a vulnerability to executive and
state ordering.
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strategy apparently available against extremism was a return to univocal,
legal dogmatism. Traditionalism often frustrated the implementation of
developmental policies; on the other hand, it offered some traction and
autonomy against repressive regimes. This turn, however, greatly limits and
accepts the fear of political extremism as a valid limit on pluralist legal
politics. Acquiescing in necessitarian, univocalism as the lesser of two evils
reinforces non-dominant (be it framed as pragmatism, policy, or
antiformalism) legal argument as political. Furthermore, it postpones a
more democratic legal discourse for another day, for the sake of
condemning-with the strongest force of a univocal and unquestionable
law-an undemocratic government today.
Some recent commentators have criticized the 1970s withdrawal of
developmentalists on different grounds." They view the internal criticism
and ultimate termination of development projects as constituting as much
a U.S.-centered and imperialist imposition as the actual development
projects to which internal critics were objecting. However, reading either
developmentalism or its demise as solely U.S. phenomena presents a picture
of Latin American actors devoid of agency and fails as a fuller explanation.
The key feature of legal developmentalism was an idea about legal reform
through changing legal reasoning techniques. This idea was not new within
Latin American legal circles by the time foreign developmentalists arrived,
nor was the extensive resistance to it merely the by-product of anti-Vietnam
War protesters or intellectual crises over modernization theory. It also
reflected the interests of those standing to lose from the reforms, and the
discursive struggle that marks its defeat.
In this regard, casting social-based argument-including its policy
pragmatist version-as illegitimate legal reasoning and reemphasizing the
univocality of law by traditionalists played a prominent role. It has also led
to an equally forceful counter-strategy by progressives of arguing social
particularity and its distinctness from state legal institutions. Here, it is
important to differentiate between incorporating social considerations
within legal reasoning and, alternatively, claiming a hypostatized field of
social interaction deemed particular to Latin America. It is the latter course
that many progressives writing about Latin America have followed. The
motivations are multifold.
As deployed by 1960s and 1970s developmentalists, discussed above,
it can be traced to attempts to sweep the decks clear, to make room for a
whole new program and set of prescriptions for the legal system. The
Id. at 184.
96. See, e.g., Cdsar Rodriguez, Globalizaci6d. Reforma Judicial y Estado de Derecho en
Amdrica Latina: El Regreso de Los Programas de Derecho y Desarrollo, EL OTRO DERECHO 25
(2001); see also Tamanaha, supra note 2.
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position is understandable: U.S. academics were not interested in engaging
in political struggles through the then existing Latin American legal
argumentative conventions nor did they want to be hamstrung by them.
Rather, they proposed a whole new playing field and a whole new agenda,
ones which they, of course, understood much better. Subsequent
generations of progressives, as discussed in more detail below, have
gravitated to this position as well. Attracted by the potential of introducing
multiplicity or pluralism to legal reasoning, consistently foreclosed in the
past, the strategy appears to be mere common sense. However, the
resistance of Latin America's legal intelligentsia played an important role.
After the victory over development, reforms premised on social reality,
pragmatism, and policy are more clearly off the table, leading progressives
to ever more accentuated claims of an excluded and alternative social law.
IV. CRITIQUES
A. Critique of Latin American Duality
The predominant diagnosis advanced by developmentalists quite
obviously suffered from an overly reified conception of both Latin
American law and Latin American peoples. State law in Latin America is
not simply an inert, foreign artifact, nor are Latin American people unique
bearers of inimitable social particularity. 9' Developmentalists deployed these
tropes, rather plainly, in furtherance of their overall project. The legal
culture was to be transformed, ostensibly, to encourage the legal system to
respond to social needs and policy objectives.9 A new deal was required.
97. See Esquirol, supra note 8, at 461-64.
98. See, e.g., Roger W. Findley, Ten Years of Land Reform in Colombia, 1972 Wis. L. REV.
880, 910-1I. Findley attributes, in part, the slow progress of Colombia's 1961 land redistribution
program, enacted out of fear generated by the Cuban Revolution, to resistance by the courts.
INCORA [the administrative agency charged with executing land reform] has
been particularly hampered ... by reversals in the Administrative Disputes
Courts, some of which appear to be considerably more sympathetic to the
interests of large landowners than to the goals of the land reform program.
Acquisitions have been invalidated for minute deviations from prescribed
procedures.... Because of the vagueness of the statute and the latitude which
it gives an unsympathetic court seeking a way to upset a finding of inadequate
use [the legal standard required], INCORA personnel in expropriation
proceedings have been greatly concerned over the possibility of lengthy appeals
and, ultimately, reversals.
Id. In discussing pending legislation in 1972 to improve the system, he notes that
[t]he bill would establish an entirely new system of specialized land courts.
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To do this, traditional political and economic arrangements enacted through
law, and their articulated justifications, had to be undone. The card played
was none other than the disconnectedness of official law from social reality.
This claim, rather than a sociological or cultural discovery, was a
challenge to the political compromises that had been hammered out through
the legal system at the time. A systematic overhaul of those settlements
could only be effected by re-opening the bases of legal decisionmaking.99
Reforming legal methods and introducing "social law" arguments were
crucial. They offered a way of renegotiating the established political and
economic deals. Drawing on a social sphere of human interaction has been
the tradition within legal theory in both the United States and Continental
Europe, as discussed above. It can be traced to calls for undoing the strict
positivism of the 19th century."° It has fueled countless reform efforts
against laws perceived as out-of-step with contemporary realities.'0 '
Conversely, it has also assisted in defending state law against delegitimating
critiques. Social theories of law are not new in Latin America either."0 2 In
different degrees, the legal culture has assimilated both challenges and
affirmations stemming from notions of a separate social source. A
comprehensive study of these would be valuable at this point, but is
unfortunately beyond the scope of this work. Yet, the existing work of
These courts would have exclusive jurisdiction to hear many of the trials and
appeals in expropriation and extinction cases now handled by the administrative
and civil courts and would be directed to apply a social philosophy sympathetic
to the land reform program.
Id. at 921.
99. See, e.g., Wolfgang G. Friedmann, The Role of Law and the Function of the Lawyer in
the Developing Countries, 17 VAND. L. REV. 181, 186 (1963).
If the lawyer continues to be identified, as he predominantly is at the present
time, with the defense of the existing order and of vested interests, against the
urgent needs and interests of societies that must lift themselves from poverty and
stagnation to a radically higher level of economic and social development, often
within a desperately short time, the lawyer will eventually be reduced to an
inferior and despised status in the developing nations.
Id.
100. See Marie-Claire Belleau, Les Juristes Inquiets (1996) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation)
(on file with the Harvard Law Library); see also FRANCOIs G NY, M&THODE D'INTERPRETATION
ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POsITIF: ESSAI CRITIQUE (1899).
101. See EHRLICH, supra note 13, at 391-411; see also Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment 11 ofl), 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 343 (1991).
102. See generally Medina, supra note 38; see also Liliana Obreg6n, Nineteenth Century
Latin American Internationalism (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation in progress) (draft on file with
author).
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Latin Americanists is sufficient to demonstrate prior uses of social theory
as a mode of intervening in legal discourse."0 3
Social alternity, in its sense of otherness from the legal system, is thus
not novel within Latin American legal discourse. Simply put, it was also the
technique of choice for developmentalists. The introduction of this concept
does not serve any new or better understanding of the workings of the legal
system. Rather, it is an argumentative move within legal discourse.
Highlighting the estrangement between legal and social spheres, simply as
a logical matter, may argue in favor of transforming existing laws or
possibly assimilating society to the law in place. Both the extensiveness of
legal reform or, alternatively, the intensity of legal penetration efforts
depend on the objectives of its proponent. In this way, it can be less a claim
about a particular reality than an effort to transform that reality.
Understood as such, developmentalists' emphasis on the dichotomy
between law and the social order then should not be read as the key,
idiosyncratic element or identity of Latin American legal systems. Instead,
these writings may best be read as advancing particular political or
programmatic objectives, swaddled in the argumentative device of social-
legal duality.
Developmentalists' claims then can be viewed as less about the actual
functioning of Latin America's legal systems than about the particular way
or particular deals cut under those official systems. Indeed, considering the
fact that many developmentalists had little prior familiarity with the region,
its languages, and the peculiarities of its various legal systems, it stands to
reason that their intervention, in the mode of description, was designed to
clear the decks. Advancing the irrelevance of official law, as a matter of
fact, gave them a free hand to drive through a broad agenda, unencumbered
by the necessity to work from within the existing state of legal play. Their
reform objectives, or renegotiation objectives, were assisted by calls
reconnecting them with social reality and attuning the legal system to local
culture. In fact, of course, Latin American legal systems were already
responding to social reality and were inseparable from local culture. The
social norms and policies in place, however, were simply different from
those advanced by developmentalists.
B. Critique of an Identity Approach to Latin American Law
The portrayal of informality, and the gap in developmentalist literature
often projects this device as a peculiar or especially exaggerated aspect of
the local legal culture, cast in terms of the sociological or cultural
particularities of Latin Americans in relationship to law. It is this claim
which is untenable as an empirical fact peculiar to the region. Such
103. See generally Medina, supra note 38.
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phenomena as gaps and informality are common features of all legal
systems. Nonetheless, in one of the better known developmentalist pieces,
Keith Rosenn, despite acknowledging the occurrence of informality
elsewhere, sustains its cultural dimension in Brazil:
Plainly Brazil is not unique in this respect, bending of legal
norms to expediency occurs in all countries .... But what is
striking about Brazil is that the practice of bending legal
norms to expediency has been elevated into a highly prized
paralegal institution called 'eito. "The 'jeito "is an integral
part of Brazil's legal culture, and in many areas ofthe law it
is employed normally rather than exceptionally. '04
It is this construction of"paralegal," sociological, or cultural identity, which
the above citation is an example, that this Essay rejects. My claim is that
giving a sociological cast to, circumventing administrative red tape through
legal fictions, even if they are far-fetched fictions, advances the idea of a
qualitatively distinct Latin American conception of law. And yet, legal
fictions are a time-honored device of all formalized systems. Furthermore,
making ajudgment as to the degree of informality and then characterizing
it as evidence of a cultural phenomenon leads to a misconception. It
downplays the role of resources and political will in effective law
enforcement, highlighting instead the social incongruity of the legal system.
This mode of arguing for law reform has contributed to the belief-and to
the rhetorical construction--of an identity of Latin American law that is
essentially discordant with a separate cultural system in place.
This particular Latin American situation is typically contrasted to the
way law operates elsewhere, especially in developed countries. Advancing
cultural reasons for the refracted ways in which official law operates across
society creates a picture of multiple and distinct systems of legality at work,
each with its own relative degree of legitimacy. Classifying legal informality
as cultural or social displaces on to Latin America a common, yet not
readily admitted, feature of all modem state law. It preserves, by contrast,
an idealization of developed legal systems as able to transfuse the entirety
of human society and amply consensual throughout, evidenced by the
projection of a uniform internalization. Such a fiction does not hold even
among officials of the same state apparatus, much less across whole
societies. In any case, its predominant effect is to undermine Latin
American legal institutions by highlighting, as extraordinary and
pathological, features which are quite common. In the long run, which is
my point in this Essay, it has not served progressive causes well.
104. See Rosenn, supra note 20, at 254.
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This is not to say that experiences of legal pluralism are wholly invented
nor that the term is completely inapposite as a characterization of certain
phenomena.0 5 In fact, legal pluralism is an appealing concept because it is
so present everywhere. Even if one differentiates between types of legal
pluralism, the notion is deployable in almost any context." Furthermore,
it has been quite effective both as a conceptual and a political tool for
indigenous communities in Latin America.0 7 Identifying indigenous norms
and recognizing them at the level of state law or quasi-state law has been,
according to its proponents, an effective strategy in recent decades.'0 8 To
what extent the outcome has been, in the best of cases, anything other than
an aggressive decentralization of dispute resolution functions can be
debated infinitely. Regardless, many progressive scholars focusing on
indigenous rights laud its potential.'" My analysis and criticism, here, do
not extend to these gains. In the context of indigenous groups, legal
pluralism may indeed be a politically useful concept. However, in terms of
a diagnosis or an intervention in national legal discourse, the notion--often
advanced as a corollary of the gap between law and society-has come to
be counterproductive to progressive aims, as is discussed below.
Furthermore, my argument does not deny that there are identifiable
differences between law as enacted and popular sentiment or even local
practices. Of course these exist. However, this does not mean that Latin
American societies are evidence of this difference any more than anywhere
else. Legal diversity, to some degree, is part and parcel of any application
105. Sally Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & Soc'y REv. 869 (1988).
106. See, e.g., BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, ESTADO, DERECHO Y LUCHAS SOCIALES
(1991) (sustaining that legal pluralism extends to collectives based on cultural, guild, racial,
religious, territorial, and other criteria, which have created their own normativity that regulate
various spheres of social life and permit them to resolve their conflicts).
107. See, e.g., RAQUEL YRIGOYEN FAJARDO, PAUTAS DE COORDINACION ENTE EL DERCHO
INDIGENA Y EL DERECHO ESTATAL (1999).
108. Id. Note however that the advances in recognizing legal pluralism in Guatemala, as
obtained in the peace accords in the mid-1990s, were ultimately defeated by a popular vote in May
1999 against the relevant modifications to the national constitution.
109. The way that separate indigenous law is being conceived by its defenders is,
nonetheless, cause for concern and subject to the same critiques levied here against dominant legal
traditionalism in Latin America. Defenders of this separate system argue for its stature on a par
with state law. Additionally, many argue the incommensurability of its cosmovision and identity
with Western law, thus arguing the inability of judging it by human rights principles (or any
outside-derived criteria). These advocates, however, run into the error of presenting indigenous
law as an arena which can only be understood and observed by outsiders but not in which they can
participate. Dangerously, under this framework, outsiders can become anyone in disagreeing with
or challenging the hegemonic interpretation of such indigenous normativity. Contra Esther
Sanchez Botero, Apraximaci6n desde la antropologla juridica a la justicia de los pueblos
indigenas, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA (2001); see generally Beatriz
Eugenia Sanchez, El reto del multiculturalismojurldico; Lajusticia de la sociedad mayor y la
justicia indigena, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA (200 1).
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of law. One need only look for it to find it. Specific communities often
assimilate generalized rules in idiosyncratic fashion; undocumented
immigrants live in a constant state of informality; political dissidents and
marginalized groups abide by their particular loyalties; and the various
institutions of civil society all produce their own codes of conduct, not all
of these always in strict alignment with written law. To the extent Latin
America is perceived as any different, in these terms, it is more logically the
result of scarce enforcement resources and lack of political will, at any one
time, to increase repression. Raising the image of lawlessness or its
positively-stated analog, an accentuated social-legal gap, to the level of a
deep cultural and historical characteristic is all together a different matter.
This is part of the legacy of law-and-development scholarship, as this
passage on the gap or extra-legality of market transactions illustrates:
Ironically, corruption itself is often a response to conditions
of insecurity. If strangers are suspect, then the world of
market transactions is cold and forbidding. A bribe turns a
transactional relationship into a "moral"
relationship-although the word "moral" may be jarring in
this context-by defining a new particularist moral
community. Such a community is functionally analogous to
the community created when one person becomes the
godparent (padrino) of another's child, making the two "co-
parents" (compadres), bound to each other in quasi-familial
loyalties that impl among other things, some forms of
economic support.
The preceding is an example of the curious characterizations sketched by
developmentalists, many seemingly riding on an undercurrent of racial or
cultural preconceptions.
C. Critique of "Exoticized" Latin American Law
During the high period of developmentalism, there were of course
already existing critiques within the bosom of law-and-society regarding
simple distinctions between the legal sphere and the social sphere.
Furthermore, there was a growing body of critical literature which took
exception to the dichotomies presented by legal sociologists and questioned
the motivations of this type of analysis. The apparatus employed by
developmentalists in Latin America was already more richly explored within
academic circles than the legacy of developmentalism would lead us to
believe. The notions of a gap and of separate spheres were contested
1 10. See, e.g., KARST & ROSENN, supra note 8, at 638 (emphasis added and footnotes
omitted).
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propositions even as they were being deployed to describe reality in Latin
America. Of course, concepts about the law's social effects and social
engineering through law were still common. What is curious is that when
depicting Latin America, it was possible to present the dichotomy in the
starkest terms possible without raising much of an eyebrow.
This aspect of developmentalist writing deserves some attention.
Scholarship about the U.S. legal system by U.S. legal scholars could not
have drawn such a clean divide between society and law, nor could it have
implanted the notion of a systemic gap between the two in such
uncontestable ways (of course, the point for most centrist U.S. scholars
writing about the United States at the time was precisely to avoid doing
so). David Trubek and Marc Galanter approached the phenomenon from
this perspective."
[I]n view of many areas that diverge from the model [liberal
legalism], there is little reason to assume that it represents
the typical or normal case of legal regulation in this [U.S.]
society. The gap between the law on the books and the law in
action has been discovered innumerable times (in race
relations, divorce, school prayers, and criminal justice, for
example) but the implications of this discovery depend on
one's picture of what is normal and typical in our legal
system. Within the received paradigm, each instance of the
gap tends to be dismissed as an exception-something
atypical, peripheral, and transient. Awareness of such
discrepancies does not induce professionals to relinquish
their model of the legal system, for the persistence of the
paradigm is powerfully supported by the training and
intellectual orientation of the profession. 1 2
While this is undoubtedly so, in the contrasting case of Latin America,
forceful pre-existing beliefs assisted. There, the gap was starkly presented
as between the official law as a whole and a separate social sphere. The
plausibility of this notion is no doubt reinforced by popular ideas about
Latin American lawlessness. The easy acceptance of a systemic breach
between law and societal behavior dovetails with widely popularized images
of Latin Americans. The figure of the "bandido" or the outlaw possibly
comes into play. The unreflective assumption of Latin Americans as law
breakers makes the academic diagnosis of the same appear rather
unproblematic. Exoticizing these societies, indeed characterizing them as
somehow beholden to different conceptions of the meaning of law, plays a
large role. In this milieu, individual scholars' observations, or even scientific
S111. See generally Trubek & Galanter, supra note 89.
112. Id. at 1082 (footnote omitted).
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studiesifyou will, about Latin Americans' lack of attention to traffic lights
or strategic manipulation of bureaucratic obstacles come to constitute
evidence of a different, qualitative idea about the nature of law.
This is not to say that proponents of gap analysis in Latin America
harbored racist designs. That would obviously be an exaggeration. Some
rather unfavorable images, however, part of the collective background, do
support the relative plausibility of developmentalists' assertions.
Conservatives may have found it only natural that Latin America was
fraught with lawlessness. Progressives, among them many
developmentalists, relativized the differences as cultural. The move of
aligning moral authority with societal behavior-rather than with official
legality-was then but a short step. That is, the norms to be valued and
upheld were to be found within society and not within the state, at least
some of them. In any case, this framework reinforces the belief that the
actual norms accepted and internalized by the people of Latin America are
quite different, sociologically, from European or Western counterparts.
State law by contrast stands either as an objectionable imposition of power
or, in the best case, a quixotic concoction of Latin American elites.
Ironically, law-and-development's diagnosis, by pressing this image of
social alternity, entrenches the notion as a dominant understanding of Latin
American law as well as an increasingly accepted self-understanding by
Latin Americans. The repeated representations of systemic lawlessness, or
"gap," between law and society, a debatable proposition at best about
underlying reality, has a more insidious effect. It contributes to the actual
internalization of this notion as part of Latin American legal identity.
Clearly, my use of cultural ideas in this context does not adhere to a view
of culture as an independent variable. Rather, it views culture as the
aggregate of a dynamic panoply of images and devices, deployed in
furtherance of myriad political projects in competition within society. As
such, culture is created and given content by influential intellectual work,
such as law and development scholarship, at times by claiming merely to
represent an already existing reality. My point is that the claim to reality,
here, is strategic-consciously or not. It is not a serious empirical claim. It
is rather an argumentative commonplace, routinely deployed within modern
legal discourse to challenge or support a particular position.
In any event, law and development scholarship marshaled the
proposition that Latin America experiences a larger degree of discrepancy
between law and society, even if other legal systems may also experience
divergences. 3 Cataloguing these divergences has, in fact, occupied a great
many Latin Americans who have taken the point seriously. This type of
113. See, e.g., Rosenn, supra note 20, at 267 (stating "[i]n Brazil, to a greater degree than in
many countries, much of the 'living law' bears little resemblance to the law on the books").
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academic work continues to attract even progressive scholars. The
framework etched by developmentalists thus continues to dominate Latin
American law scholarship today.
D. Critique of the Hyper-Social
The motivation of developmentalists and others following in their
tracks, manifestly, is often (although not only) to stake an alternative,
authoritative position from which to challenge dominant legal positions,
clearly a valid aim. Take for example, the proposal of Jorge Witker, law
professor at the Universidad Aut6noma de Mdxico, who in 1974 spliced
together the law-and-development framework, depicted here, and "French
sociological jurisprudence" to argue in favor of bridging the gap between
positive law and the law in action." 4 Specifically, he suggested how such
a move could be operationalized in Latin America:
For example, the majority of our [Latin American] legal
orders possess open institutions such as the concept of good
customs, the concept of the moral, that admits for
connotations that are not necessarily individualist, and the
public order [which is] of a vast generality in which the
social or collective interest may prevail over an absolute
liberal will. Lastly, the "so-called legal lacunae " that permit,
fundamentally, the judge to operate with flexibility and
breadth even within legal dogmatism. In synthesis, even
positivist state norms whose range of observance is limited in
our societies and whose conceptual structure is essentially
static, permits, overcoming the until now prevailing criteria,
to search for the necessary harmony between effectiveness
and validity of the norm and its efficaciousness or concrete
normativity.'
In the specific context of 1960s and 1970s law and development, the
alliance between international advisors and legal reformers in Latin America
may have consisted of nothing more than an interest in better articulated
legal decisions, requiring different considerations to be incorporated as part
of accepted legal reasoning.'1 6
114. See Jorge Witker, V., Derecho, desarrollo yformaci6njurldica, 24 REVSTA DE LA
FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MtxIco 659 (1974).
115. See, e.g., id. at 663.
116. See, e.g., Carlos Gaviria Dlaz, La enseflanza del derecho en nuestro medio, 27 ESTUDlOs
DE DERECHO: ORGANO DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS POLITICAS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD
DE ANTIOQUIA 5 (1968). Gaviria rails against the hodge-podge, "historical" reasoning methods of
mainstream Colombian jurists, which he maintains lead to legal dogmatism:
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The legacy of law and development, however, is of a different order. It
set the framework for subsequent reform efforts. It also catapulted forward
claims about a distinct and isolated social order.'In its wake, numerous
attempts have sought to prove the substantiality of a dense, alternative
legality existent in Latin America. As the argument goes, the formal legal
system is not only politically insensitive to social interests but, moreover,
is unreflective of genuine local normativity. It is this approach, deployed by
developmentalists and legal sociologists alike, which continues to frame
separate social and legal spheres in Latin America.
However, in the wake of traditionalist critiques of social methods and
arguments as non-law or as social science, to offer some traction the social
field required reconstructing, not as a normal and routine source of legal
renovation, but as a substantial, different, and irrepressible contrast to the
accepted conception of the formal legal sphere. As such, development
scholars and, more so, others following in their footsteps propose that
social realities-whether characterized as modem law or a societally-
derived code-must be introduced within Latin American legal systems.
For many Latin American progressives, loyal to the concept of socially-
connected law, this approach then entails the articulation of a separate and
available social normativity. And, as mentioned already, considerable
resources have been expended on identifying-effectively attempting to
create-such a justifiable, norm-producing social content.
My criticism here of this hyper-social field, in addition to rejecting the
particular existence of social-legal disconnection or its purportedly
extraordinary degree in Latin America, is to take objection with its
extensive effects. The paradigm entrenched by development scholars treats
behavioral divergences from the official legal system as evidence of a
separate sphere of society. The official legal system is then presented as
malfunctioning because it does not sufficiently mirror the social side.
Demonstrating the content of different social behavior is taken as proof of
this malfunctioning. It presents the justification for changing the formal
legal system. It also suggests that "social legality," "modem law," or some
such other better suited system take its place. These efforts by legal
scholars were, and continue to be, misplaced if not outright
The fear that legal formalism is instilled in many does not come from its taking
part in favor or against the existing status, rather from its remaining neutral and
not committing to the preservation of a cracked system nor to the struggle to
replace it by one judged better. In place of a theory of that type, [they] prefer to
conserve devalued doctrines or even better [doctrines] withdrawn from
circulation in the scientific world, which fulfills nonetheless the ideological
function assigned by the moment.
Id. at 8. In its place, he argues for scientific criteria which can be demonstrated objectively as
suitable to a given situation. See generally id.
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counterproductive. They reify the notion that a separately defensible social
arena, more legitimate than the legal order, exists. In this way, it may be
believed, social specificity can be more easily invoked for particular reform
efforts. However, this tactic of appealing to the hyper-social, as I explain,
should not be necessary. The social sphere is already part of the
conventional repertoire of legal technique, even within the sources of legal
authority cited by traditionalists themselves. Moreover, the vast efforts at
inscribing social-based reform with authentic or organic value is
counterproductive, considering the widespread skepticism with which these
notions are held. Statements about social norms of this type may, in the
end, be actually more easily dismissed as incapable of fulfilling their own
claims.
In any case, the quintessential legal reform strategy of the last
century-law's disconnectedness to society and reality-is repeatedly
replayed within the Latin American context, without much effect.
Continuous frustration with these failed efforts leads to larger and larger
claims about an excluded social content. Additionally, a separate social
normativity is presented as an option to state law. New legal
techniques--often empirical ones-are said to hold the promise of
introducing external society within formal legal discourse or of replacing it
all together. The impetus for reform hinges on accentuating the discrepancy
between state law and the social sphere. The greater the gap the more
untenable the traditional system and the greater the urgency for reform.
Yet, success has been misunderstood as requiring the articulation and
defense of a distinct social sphere in fact.
In short, developmentalists and their progeny have assisted in
transforming the argumentative device of "invoking the social" as an
identity-based progressive political project in opposition to the identity of
the official state system. The acquiescence in this move by many
progressives has resulted in substantial work directed at the project of
identifying and defending such a social normativity-all with the underlying
purpose ultimately of standing side-by-side or even replacing the official
legal orthodoxy. Such efforts are unnecessary-as well as
misguided-since interventions in official legality based on social reality can
be accommodated, and exist as a routine device within modem legal
systems. Ironically, it is the very work-product of legal sociologists today
that continues to reinforce the notion of separateness between law and
society and attempts to construct a never-sufficiently-well-articulated social
alternative, situated outside legal institutions.
It is this latter course which, rather than offering a promising alternative
to Latin American traditionalists, falls into their hands. In effect, with the
aim of forcing the consideration of social conditions within legal discourse
by arguing their irrepressibility and undeniability, progressives accept the
thick demarcation between legal and social realms. And, they pre-construct
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the social field--deep and dense-as different from law. Moreover, these
characterizations are often given the form of sociological or cultural traits.
The emphasis on a marked social identity typically coincides with the
vesting of Latin American informality, legal pluralism, and social practices
with a scientific, sociological flavor. Yet, this quadrant or strategy of
political legal struggle is already effectively preordained as non-law by
traditionalists, responding to the first wave of developmentalist reform
efforts." 7
The implications of my claim here extend to examples and periods
beyond the scope of this Essay." 8 However, my hypothesis points to
repeated instances in which the critical edge of social argument in Latin
American legal discourse has been blunted; its traction undone by defenders
of the existing legal bargains. While this Essay obviously can only begin to
examine this phenomenon, the circumstances surrounding the law-and-
development movement are an apt example. This is not to say that the
category of social argument was rendered problematic solely because of
developmentalism. This would be an overstatement. Nonetheless, the use
of social argument has been rendered more problematic at various historicaljunctures where proponents attempted to make significant use of the
device. Tracing the circumstances surrounding these other moments is a
topic for additional work. The study of developmentalism here presents
some significant, preliminary insights.
V. TRADITIONAL LEGAL DISCOURSE REINFORCED
Conventional jurists, plainly enough, maintain the political status quo by
cloaking it with the authority of law. This authority is upheld through the
primacy of dominant legal discourse and the discipline of accepted modes
of legal reasoning. Admitting a different or more expansive, yet similarly
authoritative, mode of legal reasoning would require new justifications or
rationalizations for the existing political bargains. This opening could, in
effect, result in the striking of different social and political arrangements. It
117. See, e.g., SOCIOLOOIAJURIDICAEN bAMCALATINA (Oscar Correas ed., 1991). Writing
the foreword on a collection of articles on legal sociology in Latin America, Correas notes the wide
divergences of these academic practices across the countries of Latin America. He notes, however,
their one common feature is their politicization. He comments on the "First World perception,"
in his view, that this is an inferior practice as compared to the First World's "scientific" legal
sociology. He notes the difficulty of Latin American legal sociology to get beyond politics, and he
also champions the case that this political position is due to the injustices that continue to afflict
Latin America (as opposed to the White world). Under my framework, Correas' observations more
than anything else reflect his condition, the marginalization (and self-marginalization) of legal
sociology as political, not because of some knowledge deficiency on their part, but as is explained
in the text of this Essay.
118. See generally Esquirol, supra note 8 (discussing another example in which the critical
edge available through French socio-historicism was also blunted).
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is precisely this new deal that was, in reality, the original goal of
developmentalism. Progress would be achieved through incremental
changes within the political economy, driven in part by the legal system,
which would enlarge the class of enfranchised citizenry. This was the goal
of 1960s Latin American reformism, as opposed to a more radical,
revolutionary break. In effect, the notion of alternative legal techniques has
the very purpose of re-dealing the cards.
However, it is also this renegotiation which traditional jurists highlighted
as a way to intimidate progressive reformers. The fear invoked was a
disruption of the delicate political balance established through law. Absent
traditional legal limits, a free-for-all could ensue. Specifically, extremist
political tendencies in Latin America might not be kept in check. The
political aim of developmentalists' interventions, in this case, would be
completely reversed. Rather than offer room within the legal system to
pursue progressive aims, developmentalist methods could be just as easily,
if not more easily, used to justify repressive regimes. Particularly, if the
developmentalists in question believed in the vast malleability of law, this
danger loomed large and real. Furthermore, even if a new political bargain
could be struck, it would not henceforth have recourse to the
unquestionable authority of law to preserve it. The legal sphere would be
indelibly compromised, undermining its ability to justify a new political
bargain, while also admitting its past role in legitimating the old order.
The end of developmentalism offers some clues to understanding the
failure of other historical attempts at introducing social reality, pragmatism,
policy, or generally antiformalism within Latin American legal discourse."
9
Considering the political leanings of most development lawyers, the risks
presented were obviously too great. However, the choices presented were,
I argue, unjustifiably limited. Reformism was too quickly defeated by the
fears of its own proponents. Chiefly, that fear was made all too real as a
result of underlying perceptions of Latin American political culture. The
reality of autocratic, military governments and right-wing coups reinforced
the plausibility of a potentially more reactionary political deal as a result of
119. See, e.g., Bilder & Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 475-76.
I would suggest that, in a remarkable contradiction, the implication of
Trubek/Galanter's objection to instrumental attitudes toward law is in direct
conflict with the thrust of their argument and with their legacy to the field: what
is needed in a developing country-to protect against the dangers of a purely
instrumental view of law-is an established and functioning, formalistic-oriented
rule-of-law system!
Id. Bilder and Tamanaha fall into this false dilemma as well. They address the alternative pole,
legal formalism. This is precisely the argument made by Latin American traditionalists.
Formalism represented the discursive practice under the latter's control.
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
a shift in the legal status quo. In addition, at least for developmentalists,
social norms were not in reality a democratic check on state law.
Traditionalists, and chastened developmentalists, understood Latin
American societies as lacking these constraints. 2 ' The perception of such
lawlessness is, in fact, what makes the ultimatum so compelling. Legal
traditionalists, at least, offered the possibility of keeping right-wing rulers
to some account. If belief in the unquestionability of law was somehow
shaken, then the legal establishment would be at a loss to reestablish
authority. Undemocratic autocrats would be able to wield their power
freely.1
2 1
This conundrum has played a repeated role in dismantling reformist legal
projects in Latin America. The choice facing reformers is, on the one hand,
to uphold the sanctity of law with its existing trade-offs, or, on the other,
to do without the legal system as a tool of social governance. They must
either withdraw from reform efforts or risk losing the support, and cover,
of traditionalist forces. By their rejection of social-based legal discourse,
traditionalists in effect refuse to agree to law's standing as unquestionable
authority if it means legitimating a new political deal ushered in by social
reformism. 22 This places reformers in the position of potentially winning
the battle, but at the price of losing the war. Any gains achieved would
stand precarious as a result of the compromised nature of legal authority,
120. Bilder and Tamanaha argue that a debilitating critique, stopping "1970s
developmentalism" in its tracks, was the charge of ethnocentrism associated with liberal legalism.
Id. at 481-83. My argument is that this is a rather secondary point if not an all together irrelevant
concern--a red herring for both those making the claim and those rebutting it-at least in the
Latin American context. Traditionalist Latin American legal discourse emphasizes its membership
within the Western family of law. Thus, transplanting further aspects of Western liberal legalism
is not much of an objection at all. Additionally, the entire critique of ethnocentrism is built on the
dualism of law and society. Specifically, the sociological claim of a separate and autochthonous
law is upheld by contrasting it with an essential and contrasting development identity. This Essay
offers a different framework from which to conceptualize this dualism, and the claims and
critiques that spring from it.
121. Indeed, for Gardner, for example, the Allende project of "revolution through law"
consisting essentially of dusting off old laws and finding loopholes in existing laws to push
through radical reforms (not in fact contemplated by the formal legal materials) demonstrates how
legal instrumentalism is most effective the more authoritarian or non-democratic a government
is. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 179. Gardner's argument basically boils down to the point that
Allende's brand of legal instrumentalism did not work in the end because he retained (did not
close down) democratic legal institutions (unlike in Brazil) and arrogated legislative power to
himself. See id. Under this framework, the more authoritarian the better legal instrumentalism,
and thus U.S. legal models will work to legitimate whatever is said to be law. See id.
122. See, for example, Jorge Witker's description of the conservative Chilean Supreme
Court's systematic undermining of President Salvador Allende's social program, leading to his
de-legitimation and the ultimate overthrow of democratic government. Witker, supra note 115,
at 667-69.
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sabotaged by traditionalists threatening that any social reformist success
would be the product of a politicization of law.
Reformism foreclosed, the option left would involve a system-wide,
revolutionary rejection of official law. This was exactly the turning point for
developmentalism. With few options for progressive reform that would
preserve legal authority, proponents would have to reject the entire system,
in terms of its foreignness or social disconnectedness, and then follow
through with the conclusions. The choice, under this state of affairs, soon
becomes radicalized: reject official law and draw on other social constraints
as a system of governance or desist from social reform through the legal
system.
My argument is not in favor of either of these options. It is rather to
argue against the necessary nature of this limited choice. In its place, I am
advancing social-based argument within national legal discourse through to
its ultimate conclusions, notwithstanding the threats of traditionalists.'23
Furthermore, my analysis urges progressive reformers to re-take their
engagement with official law, broadening the field of political struggle and
debate over the meanings of texts and policy. My approach proposes a
more democratic legal discourse, expanding both the terms and
transparency of legal debate, rejecting necessitarian univocalism without
foreclosing the above-political authority of law. It is not a very
revolutionary or paradigm-shifting proposal, but in the Latin American
context it challenges a true bottleneck choking political reform. Failing to
address it only leaves a much more extreme choice, in which the only
alternative is advocating the overthrow of Latin American states' legality
with little hope of achieving any better social arrangements.
To clarify, my claim is not that social-based argument is a panacea for
progressive reform. Like any legal technology, it has its limits and its
reversals. Still, as part of the conventional repertoire of democratic legal
systems, it opens a channel for alternative interpretations and positions
available under state law. As such, it is a significant part of a democratic,
123. Various commentators, as well as several references in this Essay, note the specific
Chilean experience from 1970 to 1973, under the socialist Salvador Allende government. It is
commonly accepted that Allende's reform strategy of "revolution through law" consisted of legal
instrumentalism in relation to already existing laws. The maneuver was the design of a small
circle, not enjoying the support of most of the legal profession. To the extent that combining
pragmatism and state law is understood as exemplified (and exhausted) by the Allende
experiment, it should be noted that the actual form that it took in Chile is quite different from my
own proposal here. Allende's legal loopholes strategy was generally perceived as an intentional
misreading, or exaggeration, of often outdated legal sources by a few close collaborators. My
proposal here refers to the inherent mulitiplicty comfortably available through legal interpretation
and legal decisionmaking, which includes reliance on social argument. It does not seek to defend
a system whereby ostensibly contrived meanings to laws-on-the-books are pushed through to
justify state action.
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or democratically-oriented, system of law. It is quite telling that traditional
Latin American jurists have, in numerous instances, rejected and
marginalized socially-based techniques. Possibly fearing class revolt, or
substantial renegotiation, their objective has been to narrow the discipline
of legal methods. Eliminating one of the sources of the regeneration of legal
systems and their ability to respond to popular forces is, in the end, grave.
The more limited the possibilities for addressing popular and democratic
demands, the more vulnerable and precarious are state legality and the
underlying political deal it preserves.
At a minimum, even if we understand socially-based legal decision-
making to mean merely the discourse of democratic participation and
accountability, resisting it aggressively will surely backfire. Traditionalists
may believe that they have much to lose by allowing for social decision-
making, and on a personal level this may very well be. The class of jurists
now exercising near exclusive ability to speak for the law would be unable
to retain their monopoly. Legal discourse, at a minimum, would be
democratized. Yet, from a conservative political perspective, social-based
reasoning may in the long run actually be more effective. It could reinforce
the authority of the legal class and foster more support for the political
bargains which may be reached. Of course, those political bargains would
have to be, at least discursively, struck differently. This may lead to some
tangible sought-after renegotiations in certain circumstances. And, at a
minimum, it would extend democratic considerations-to the extent this
expanded legal discourse can provide them-throughout more of the
institutions of the state.
By contrast, the shibboleth of law versus society, reinforced by
developmentalism and its demise, has erected a zero-sum game for thinking
about Latin American law. Its legacy makes available two potential political
stances, roughly speaking. Either one joins the project of making the state
more like the people, or one joins the project of making the people more
like the existing state. Regardless, the task remains under the discipline of
this framework to champion one identity over the other. Conservative
approaches to this problem describe the issue as one of the penetration of
state law into popular sectors. That is, the perceived gap between law and
society is to be addressed by redoubling efforts at social transformation
through the legal system. '24 In the main, this is the underlying blueprint for
legal traditionalists in Latin America. The call for legal penetration
124. See, e.g., Rosenn, supra note 32, at 543-49. Rosenn uses the notion of the Brazilian jeito
to capture, in his view, an extra-legal social device to circumvent an obsolete legal system. See
id. Yet, he does not argue in favor of rebuilding the legal system on the basis of the jeito. See id.
Instead, he advocates for legal penetration by the formal legal system "reasonably attuned to the
times and culture, a high degree of obedience to the rule of law, and impersonal, efficient
administration of the laws" which would make resort to the jeito unnecessary. Id. at 548-49.
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reinforces the project of strengthening the official legal system and re-
making society in its image. From a progressive perspective, this project is
merely the perpetuation of control by legal elites and enforcement of the
traditional political deal. Legal penetration, in this view, would not be
neutral. It would not merely promote the harmonization of a common
national culture of legal coercion. Instead, the inherent hierarchical tilt
within state law would be more effectively imposed across national society.
For more progressive commentators, highlighting the discrepancy
between law and society offers an indictment of the class-control and
cultural insularity of state law in Latin America. 25 Interventions are thus
directed at offering substitutes. Progressive efforts highlight alternatives to
state legality, arguing they are better attuned to local, social activity. The
discrepancy between law and the social order is presented as a diagnosis of
the Latin American situation. The social order is offered as an alternative
to the formal legal system-although, as discussed in the case of
developmentalism, without much chance of success.
By accepting this duality, progressives are brought to heel. They eschew
direct engagement with state law because they reject its central project of
imposing the traditional political deal on society. They embrace social law
as pertaining to a sphere outside the formal legal system. Yet, the latter can
never be attained, or fully implemented, because it would come only at the
price of renouncing the special status of law. Traditionalists can sustain this
threat as long as progressives do not revisit the underlying duality premise.
By shunning "formal" yet social-based argument and interpretation within
national legal discourse, and not rebutting threats about law's politicization,
progressives leave open the field of state law to traditionalists. As such,
they can only argue for reform from the sidelines.
Progressives have in this way miscalculated the potential for
intervention. By insisting on challenges from the sidelines, they have
implicitly accepted the ultimatum put to them. Accepting the premise of
social-legal dualism and its substantive difference reinforces the
traditionalist monopoly of national legal discourse. The latter remains as the
sole way of defending legal authority autonomous of the state. Like
everyone else, progressives fear undermining law as a separate source of
power. However, the room for progressive positions is self-selectedly
peripheral if traditionalists alone are left to speak for the (national) law - no
matter how much discredit is heaped from the margins in terms of class
125. See, e.g., Leopoldo Munera Ruiz, La justicia es p'a los de ruana, in SOCIOLOGIA
JURIDICA EN AMikRICA LATINA 45 (1991) (discussing how the alternative uses of law strategy in
Colombia is based-in part as the result of a nine year reading group of social law scholars in
Bogota-on an essentially materialist view of the primacy of social relations in the determination
of law).
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bias, social disconnectedness, and the multiplicity of other normative
systems.
Furthermore, progressives have not appreciated the full workings of
legal discourse. Maintaining a monopoly over legal power requires
continuous reinforcement of dominant rhetorical constructions. Organized
interests within society-much as any good lawyer-deploy the full range
of legal argument, encompassing formalism, antiformalism, pragmatism,
necessitarianism, and almost any other legal technology. However,
accepting the identity of official Latin American law as distinct from social
life works in effect to stabilize, as long as such identity holds, the
monopoly of currently dominant interests. Vesting the legal system with
essentialist characteristics, accepted across the spectrum of legal politics,
leads to the perceived impermeability, and thus consequently-produced
impermeability, of traditionalist interpretations of law. In that order,
oppositional projects in legal politics come to be conceivable, exclusively
in contrasting identity terms.
VI. FROM THE SIDELINES
This Part focuses principally on the route taken by scholars of social
law within Latin America. As noted above, development scholarship
attributed the disconnection to a state law apparatus far removed from the
lives of local inhabitants. To the extent state law is brought into focus, it
is depicted as legal formalism, cut from a civilian mold, operated by legal
elites. In addition to the differences of class it designates, the existence of
a popular social law highlights the cultural, even racial, identification of
Latin America's state law. Specifically, state law stands for Latin
American assimilation to the broader culture of the foreign law it emulates.
In consequence, it privileges European cultural forms over local practices.
In these terms, the agenda for political progressives appears to follow, as
a matter of course, to recuperate the cultural and social particularity of
governance norms among Latin American peoples. Ultimately, these would
then take the place of an exclusionary, entrenched legal culture reproduced
by and for elites.
My argument is that the reaction to law and development, and the
latter's defeat, lead to, once again, a missed opportunity for reform. Rather
than introduce a more democratic and pluralist legal discourse, it merely
reinforced the power of traditionalist positions as the sole embodiment of
law and independent check on state action. The effort's demise, actively
sought by Latin America's legal intelligentsia, perversely provided another
occasion to link social-based legal argument with political maneuvering.
At the same time, it further cemented the framework of divergent social
and official normativities as the central paradigm. In this way, the demise
of law and development, along with other attempts to introduce reformist
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techniques within Latin American legal thinking, has contributed to the
current state of play and the range of positions and strategies deployed by
progressives within Latin America.
A. The Politics ofAutochthonous Social Law
Local community norms may be no more progressive than state law.
Indeed, localized legality may harbor some quite troubling convictions
regarding minorities, punishment, and the vulnerable. While their study may
indeed offer a clearer picture of actual community sentiment, it is not
necessarily a treasure trove of progressive politics. Moreover, once
enshrined as organic law, local norms are less amenable to dynamic reform.
Indeed, attempts to champion the rights of women or minorities are resisted
by reference to long-standing community standards. And, in fact, if
community legality is precisely the source of law advanced by social
scholars, then it is its very particularity and deep-rooted nature that must
be respected. Intervention from the outside or even by reformist elements
of the local community would suffer a formidable presumption favoring
tradition-however it becomes defined.
The term legal pluralism, in the sense of different systems of legality, is
often used to describe this project." It invokes alternative normative
orders existing throughout society. Through this medium, community and
group norms may not only enjoy comparable standing to state law, they
may also offer a better description of internalized coercion within the
locality. This first presupposition of scholars of the social law is based on
the notion of an alternative legal code. It is a key notion as it informs the
diagnosis of a misalignment of law and society in Latin America. It offers
a non-racist yet often racialized explanation of the relative "irrelevance" of
official law perceived in Latin America. It is not that there is a social or
cultural deficiency in terms of abiding by legal obligations. Instead, the
126. See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Los paisajes de lajusticia en las sociedades
contempordneas, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA 85-150 (Boaventura de
Sousa Santos & Mauricio Garcia-Villegas eds., 2001) (noting "until recently the subject of legal
pluralism was centered on the identification of local legal orders, infra-state, that coexisted in
different ways with national official law"). Santos proposes a more complex notion of legal
pluralism that would encompass the hybridity and inter-legality of local and national as well as
global legal orders, "each one of these has its own normativity and legal rationality as a result of
which relations among them are many times tense and conflictive." Id. While Santos proposes a
porous and hybrid conception, the central image is of multiple identities colliding or coming
together. See generally id. My analysis suggests that this approach repeats the pitfalls and dead-
ends of identity-based analysis, although it does address simplistic Manichean dualism. See also
Capeller, supra note 65, at 100 (stating "[iun this way, legal research at a local level demonstrates
that pluralism and interlegality are key concepts for a post-modem conception of law"); see
generally Gabriel Ignacio G6mez, Justicia comunitaria en zonas urbanas, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO
DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA (1991).
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point is that Latin Americans, or at least some of them, march to the beat
of a different drummer. If only we could find the tune being played, the
legal system could be realigned with society's previously formed legal
commitments.
Additionally, legal pluralism of this type has had a popular political
effect. It signifies respect for historically marginalized groups. Research
agendas on particular groups' internal orderings offers the potential of
political empowerment. Armed with their own law, proponents may then
expect economic and other resources to follow close at hand. Promoting
norms coming from within the particular group offers a better chance for
legal compliance and more respect for enforcement efforts. Thus, not only
would a people's law suggest more effective law enforcement, it would be
more democratic. Again, this broad category of thinking about law is
premised on the existence in Latin America of an alternative conception of
law. Thus, the task at hand appears as one of uncovering the content of
such alternative conception.
In terms of the actual content of any such social law, the scholarship is
varied. "' Of course, no coherent ready-made alternative to state law has
been revealed. It should be clear that most proponents of legal pluralism
and social law do not claim, which would be a large claim, an alternative
legal order of the same stature waiting in the wings to be uncovered and
implemented. Rather, in its most typical meaning, the notion of social law
boils down to two beliefs: (1) particular legal rules exist which are more
authentic (to particular groups) than state law, and (2) instances of dispute
resolution are available which are more attuned to the local culture than the
state. However, much of Latin American sociological jurisprudence is
bogged down in endless theorizing over the type of relationship existing
between law and society. 2 ' Rummaging through a multiplicity of theories
and theorists occupies scholars rather removed, striving more for a
convincing blueprint of legal and social interconnectedness than those
attempting to operationalize an alternative justice.
In any case, there are, by way of support, sufficient development-era
studies confirming the informalism with which ordinary people conduct
their "legal" affairs. Informality, social norms, and the gap between law and
society all dovetail in reinforcing the same duality claim. Yet, we would
expect nothing different from ordinary citizens in any society. We would
not expect that they conduct their interpersonal interactions as magistrates
or advocates before a court of law. Nor would legal concepts or legal
categories be assimilated strictly or even understood as jurists would
understand them. The prevalence of an informal sector or an informal
127. See generally EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS ENCOLOMBIA (Boaventura de Sousa
Santos & Mauricio Garcia-Villegas eds., 2001).
128. See generally SOCIOLOGIA JURIDICA EN AMtRICA LATINA (1991).
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version of state law is thus far from evidence of the separate identity of
social law. On the contrary, it is evidence of the commonality of legal
practices. Informal or disparate application is part and parcel of any system
of law and of any system of coercion, as discussed above.
Additionally, arguing for a particular option on the basis of its
immanence in society is not uncommon within any system of law, for
several centuries now. It is not, it should be noted, a legal device leading to
one type of interpretation. Differing views of a socially-based rule may be
advanced; in such case, the same technology can advance different
outcomes. Moreover, legal reasoning of this type also advances
conservative positions, positions which can reinforce the status quo on
social and political issues. This is not to say that norms or notions drawn
from particular social groups may not be a valuable intervention. On the
contrary, a main point of this Essay is to argue for the permeability and
openness of state law to these sources of law. For the sake of clarity,
however, advancing alternative, socially-inflected norms distinct from
traditional interpretations is quite different than claiming autochthonous
sites of norm generation which necessarily trump other positions. The latter
is nothing other than a decentralizing political project, riding on a
preference for more "local tradition-based" decisionmaking and the
reinforcement of group identities. More than pointing out the downsides to
this latter approach, my focus here is its impact on traditionalist dominance
of legal discourse.
B. Abandonment of Progressive, Counter-Dominant Law
The appeal of "informal law" is another of the legacies of the law-and-
development movement for progressive scholars. Rather than devote
energies to challenging traditionalist legal positions, numerous scholars
have focused instead on studying the particularities of social groups within
Latin American politics.'29 Indeed, a significant portion of law and
development scholarship and its aftermath, focuses on the law of the barrio,
the law of the urban slum, the law of the armed forces, the law of the
guerrillas, the law of particular indigenous groups, and the law of any
plausibly identifiable social grouping. 30
129. See DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 106; EL CALEIDOSCOP1O DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN
COLOMBIA (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Mauricio Garcla-Villegas eds., 2001); RAQUEL
YRGOYEN FAJARDO, PAUTAS DE COORDINACION ENTRE EL DERECHO INDIGENA Y EL DERECHO
ESTATAL (1999).
130. See G6mez, supra note 126. G6mez's work, for example, is an update on development-
era studies of urban barrios. See generally id. In it, he describes how recent attempts by the
Ministry of Justice to "informalize" (used to mean "decentralize") local dispute resolution by
regulating "conciliation in equity" (community justice) programs have mostly failed. See generally
id. He describes the failure as one of trivializing the social. See id. at 269.
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By siphoning off progressives, the emphasis on social law has thinned
the ranks of counter-dominant legal discourse. While this claim is
impossible to quantify, it is clear that many progressive Latin American
legal thinkers adhere to sociological frameworks and empirical research
agendas. By contrast, many fields of official law are thoroughly dominated
by traditional, conservative scholars. Indeed, it is often difficult to find the
full range of legal and political positions, afforded by the ordinarily
available, multiple interpretations of legal materials. Often, a juristic
orthodoxy is capable of capturing and univocally interpreting entire fields
of law. 13' Of course, in some cases this is assisted by the hierarchical
arrangement--also part of the legal profession-which prizes some
traditional academic voices over others. But, beyond this admittedly uneven
playing field, many times progressives have simply not articulated the quite
plausible, formal counter-arguments. 32 They may disdain engaging the
official materials believing they lack legitimacy. As such, the calculation is
According to this perspective, the new state proposals of community justice are
limited to creating uniform models of regulation and control of "small" conflicts
according to which the reality of the social micro-stages and daily relations must
adapt, even at the expense of the group identity in which they emerge.
Id. Thus, even when the state takes an informal social approach, its performance is evaluated in
the context of a "more real" social identity conflicting with an intrinsically formal legal system
unwilling to share power with informal systems. See id.; see also Consuelo Acevedo et al.,
Justicia comunitaria en zonas campesinas: Los casos de los municipios de Caparrapi y Arcaya
en Cundinamarca, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA (Boaventura de Sousa
Santos & Mauricio Garcia-Villegas eds., 2001).
131. See, e.g., Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis of the Colombian
Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23 (2000).
132. For example, Rodrigo Uprimny manifestly struggles to defend (in keeping with his
professed conviction in favor of legal pluralism) the recent Colombian legislation newly instituting
"justices of the peace" to administer community justice at the local level. Uprimny finds comfort
in the fact that justices of the peace may be able to function as the "hinge" between state law and
community norms, integrating the two. He leaves the job of constructing an "integrated" legal
discourse to the newest, most vulnerable, and least resourced legal professions-these newly-
formed, mostly rurally-located legal officials. No doubt opening more judicial offices, de-
centralizing, and making dispute-resolution available are rather positive developments. However,
most studies of these state-sponsored community justice efforts (even in the same volume in which
Uprimny is published) note that they are grossly hamstrung by the formal logic of state law and
are much less effective (influential) than home-grown dispute-resolution structures. In short, the
democratic opening that justices of the peace (as well as other judges) may make use of cannot
be utopically projected as the result of de-centralization or procedural legal pluralism (and the
physical contact ofjudges with the social), rather it is a process of construction of a national legal
discourse in which progressives must take an active and engaged part. Contra Rodrigo Uprimny,
Yepes iJusticia comunitaria en contextos violentos y antidemocrdticos?, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO
DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA 309 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Mauricio Garcla-Villegas
eds., 2001).
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to invoke instead "extra-legal" arguments based directly on political or
social expediency.
The predominant effect has been the abandonment of state law by many
progressive scholars. Rather than direct their political
intervention-whether it be in terms of wealth redistribution or
enfranchising marginalized groups-faith has been placed in endorsing
alternative, sometimes highly local, notions of legality. 133 Yet, in terms of
results, it has been noted already that no unproblematic or coherent
alternative emerges. Instead, the social field simply presents the project of
reconstructing a different legality, and the opening of a different playing
field not necessarily more progressive or just. By shifting energies to
constructing an ideally imagined social field, however, scholars have left
most other legal battles open to more conservative colleagues. 134
Whatever one's position is as to state law or law generally, the fact
remains that official legality is central to democratic governance. 35 No
doubt, perceptions of law's ineffectiveness and low levels of enforcement
undermine the appeal of engaging dominant legal discourse. Yet, to the
extent that these make engagement seem inconsequential or irrelevant, they
133. Interestingly, in response to the rhetorical question that Boaventura de Sousa Santos
asks himself as to why social practices should be thought of as separate systems of normativity,
he answers, "[p]ut in these terms, this question can only be answered by another question: Why
not? Why should the case of law be any different than religion, art or medicine?" See DE SOUSA
SANTOS, supra note 106, at 138. My analysis here ventures a response.
134. See generally Carlos Maria Cfircova, Teorlas Juridicas Alternativas, in SOCIOLOGIA
JURIDICA EN AMRICA LATINA, 25 (1991). In accord with the central proposition here, Circova
puts it this way:
The field of legal theory is abandoned: "Given that the traditional models do not
work to account for the relation law/society, (we should) migrate toward the more
productive terrains of sociology and (we should) do legal sociology." With that,
the theoretical categories organized by the traditional thinking of jurists is
maintained undisturbed and the legal sociologists worry neither essentialists nor
positivists.
Id. at 30.
135. See Wanda de Lemos Capeller, Entre o ceticismo e a utopia: A sociologiajuridica
Latino-americana frente ao debate europeo, in SOCIOLOGIA JURIDICA EN AMERICA LATINA 75
(199 1). Capeller recognizes the centrality of state law, and cites Boaventura de Sousa Santos for
the same proposition. However, she attempts to explain the marginality of sociological
jurisprudence in Brazil as a structural phenomenon, using the center/periphery metaphor; as a
peripheral state, Brazil's sociological jurisprudence is therefore "peripherical." I think she takes
the metaphor too far. My own focus is much less to attempt a comparative description of the place
and role of sociological jurisprudence in Latin America versus Europe in broad structural terms.
Rather, my analysis here describes an historical attempt to use this technology as part of a specific
political project by a certain group of individuals. Only as a consequence, and by hypothesizing




are deceptive. For in fact, legal argument is a significant medium of political
organization, with undeniable effects throughout the polity. Thus, the
question cannot be reduced to whether or not Latin Americans are
respectful of traffic rules or whether or not land registries are effective in
enforcing property rights. As in any legal system, there are discrepancies
between the letter of the law and how it is carried out. Possibly, even, in
countries with fewer resources those discrepancies are more evident.
However, in terms of allocations of political and economic power, state law
is a significant player even if its role at a particular point in time is to divest
itself of such authority. Clearly, this is not to say that its power is equitably
exercised or democratically executed. Quite the contrary, Latin American
legal authority over a number of areas has been captured by a small number
of personalities, typically quite circumspect about redistributing power.
Such figures are conservatives by definition, they oppose undermining their
own source of authority. Law thus continues to be defended as univocal
and impervious to alternative interpretation. In this way, the societies'
respected legal experts are often in the position to speak for the law,
effectively unopposed. This aspect of the Latin American legal profession,
while not in any structural way preempting progressive reform, does in fact
make it more difficult.
My hypothesis, in this connection, is that the situation would be
different if Latin America's scholars of the social turned more of their
attention to contestatory legal debate, especially at the national level.
Offering alternatives to official positions, captured by conservative
colleagues, would provide the opening of the legal system which is much
desired not on the basis of an alternative conception of a coherent legality,
much less in terms of a different cultural quality of law that must be
recuperated or integrated. Instead, an amplified legality-more democratic
and responsive to Latin America's diverse populations-lies in challenging
orthodox views of Latin America's jurists as to what the law requires.
C. Foreclosing the Potential for a More Pragmatic Legal Discourse
A separate by-product of social scholars' forays into law in Latin
America is also negative. It bears repeating that this is not a comment as to
any necessary implication of a social approach. It does, however, describe
the way in which a social approach, in the aggregate, has operated in Latin
America and what remains as its lingering effects. To the point, the hyper-
social ideas reinforced by developmentalism have effectively foreclosed the
exercise of a progressively-inflected pragmatism within the region. The
particular history of law-and-development offers some insight on this
particular point.
A mainstay of this particular social approach to legal legitimacy involved
de-linking state law from purely formal concepts. In other words, to make
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room for alternative legality within the state, law-and-development scholars
found themselves in opposition to the traditional operators of Latin
American legal systems. In part descriptive, in part evaluative, the operators
of the traditional system were characterized as formalists. While this latter
concept has many meanings, the most significant one for development
scholars, however, was the rigidity of legal interpretation. In an
environment where one group or class controls, the legal system is
impervious to democratically responsive modes of interpretation. In other
words, the legal elite is thoroughly in control and in the singular position to
speak for the law.
Key to changing this state of affairs was the introduction of an
alternative mode of legal decisionmaking. The first target was the
univocality of legal interpretation. The push for reform in legal education
and broader access to courts, characteristic of law-and-development, was
tailored to meet this objective. However, as was alluded to earlier, the
political climate of the time made an apparently more fluid conception of
law a dangerous instrument. In the hands of reactionary politicians, legal
plasticity could just as easily sanction repressive measures as the more
humanist goals sought by developmentalism.
Once law and development scholars came around to see it this way,
many withdrew their efforts. The upshot was that alternative legality,
pluralism, and pragmatism became more firmly associated with particular
politics, either of the far right or the far left. Consequently, it came to be
seen that only in a progressive political environment could social or
pragmatic notions of law thrive. In a reactionary environment, legal
formalism-universal and univocal-was a better ally against arbitrary
action. While no doubt this was a plausible reading of the situation at the
time, it reaffirms the perception that alternative legal discourse is political
while traditionalism is not.
The fear of legitimating dictators surely cannot be discounted. Pushing
for a transition in legal discourse which has this effect is certainly not
appealing. However, desisting and furthermore characterizing the project
of legal pragmatism, within the context of law and development, as dn
openly political calculation has left broader effects. It has reinforced the
connection between the pragmatic (or social) and the non-legal, either in
the form of state instrumentalism or, alternatively, cultural particularity.136
136. See, e.g., Acevedo et al., supra note 130. Presenting the still-current dualism, the
authors contrast state legal organs in rural communities with the more personal interactions of
campesinos with respect to conflict resolution (specifically, based on their perception of official
justice as a last resort and their idiosyncratic application of official norms). The latter is
conceptualized as a separate system, "la justicia de ach" in which "[i]t is the pragmatism of
campesino rationality which makes possible the incorporation within their culture of this know-
how (i.e. more localized justice), with concrete solutions deriving from knowledge of its causes
2003]
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The line between law and politics is further embedded, with the law on the
side of only traditionalist interpretation.
This configuration describes the twin fears reinforcing objections to a
more open legal discourse in Latin America. Latin American jurists have
traditionally been preoccupied with defending state institutions from the
onslaught of unruly Latin American societies. Indeed, even socially-
committed scholars have questioned the feasibility of liberal democratic
states in Latin America. Faced with illiberal societies, the worry thus arises
that states may fall prey to openly undemocratic forces. The rule of law has
thus been identified with a very particular mode of legal discourse. This is
not to say that the range of potential legal outcomes available under more
pragmatic approaches would be excluded under Latin America's brand of
legal debate. As a discursive practice, it is not outcome-determinative per
se. However, this mode of discourse does distance legal authority from the
reach of local society and, clearly, legal progressives. In this way the
potential range of political volatility is to be narrowed. The objective of
Latin America's legal elites is an above-politics/above-social source of
authority. Their mode of doing so is a well-patrolled discourse of singular
legal options.
In any case, some challenges have been waged against this
straightjacketting of Latin American legal reasoning. A case in point is the
law-and-development attempt outlined in this Essay. To repeat, its chief
means was to highlight the incongruity between social and legal orders.
Progressive heirs of this strategy have further attempted to erect a social
order that could rival traditional law. By reinforcing the conception of a
deep social sphere, however, social pluralists' efforts have not gotten very
far. It has caused the further abandonment of progressive engagement with
the official legal system, leaving orthodox jurists freer reign. Moreover, its
promised rewards are always delayed until after the reconstruction of an
alternative social sphere. Rather minimal, its more immediate gains have
consisted of establishing exceptions to state law. As such, it has only further
undermined the routine and ordinary argumentative use of "social"
interpretation and argument throughout national legal discourse.
VII. SOME WAYS OUT OF THE DEVELOPMENTALIST BIND
This Part traces, in cursory fashion, part of the legacy of failed
developmentalism in the 1960s and 1970s. It catalogues the main strategies
and frameworks deployed by Latin American legal progressives today. This
is but a brief sampling of the very rich legal debate currently taking place
in many Latin American countries. Several of my examples draw from
and experience, applied by one of their own." Id. at 284.
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Colombian legal scholarship, which has especially experienced a boom in
recent years.
These works demonstrate a variety of reactions to the limitations of the
law and development paradigm. Faced with the dichotomy expressed by
developmentalism, these examples reveal attempts struggling with the
resultingly reinforced, dominant framework. They also offer some options
for reformism and progressive intervention within Latin American legal
discourse.
A. Unapologetic Formalists
Some progressive scholars have reclaimed the tradition of formalist legal
interpretation as their own. That is, championing a sort of legal nationalism,
formalism is conceived as the autochthonous mode of legal interpretation
in the region.'37 This is a curious turn of the meanings earlier ascribed to
formalism and authenticity. Whereas formalism was perceived as the
concoction of elites, informalism signified the genuine law of the people.
More recent defenses of formalism attempt to turn this critique on its head.
Scholars of course are careful not to justify their defense of formalism
purely in terms of the authentic. Notions of authenticity have been widely
debunked already. Therefore, the claim is based in terms of tradition or
some such other. Formalism by extension is a significant part of Latin
American legal tradition. It need not be ejected, the argument goes, in favor
of some foreign vogue for pragmatist antiformalism.
This is a compelling argument. It rejects the false dualism of social law
and state law. It also adopts a sophisticated interpretation of authenticity.
Furthermore, it acknowledges the indeterminate nature of formalism. In
other words, progressive objectives need not require pragmatic legal
methods. Formal interpretation, while generally associated with
conservative legal decisionmaking, can serve quite well. Conversely,
pragmatism or realism is no more a guarantor of an enlightened social
order. This latter insight comprehends the fear experienced by development
scholars. As mentioned above, development scholars placed much stock in
pragmatism and the social as a way of democratizing Latin American legal
systems and promoting progressive political objectives. They desisted when
their methods proved equally amenable to promoting conservative goals
and further entrenching military dictators.
Defenders of formalism attempt to advance beyond the limitations of
developmentalists. They do so by claiming formalism as their own.
Additionally, this position also attempts to capitalize on the perceived
strengths of formalism. That is, it is more clearly defensible as a source of
137. See, e.g., Medina, supra note 38; see also IMER FLORES, INTEGRATED JURISPRUDENCE
(2001) (pre-publication text on file with author).
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authority beyond the reach of sheer political power. Making law
unreachable from the play of society and politics enhances its perception of
objectivity and neutrality. Jurists are thus in a stronger position to interject
the law as a limit on governmental power.
Some of the weaknessess with this approach have to do with the
relatively nontransparent and undemocratic way in which this technology
"works. Discussion of this point is contained above in reference to
traditional modes of Latin American legal discourse. An additional
weakness is that it underestimates the effect of normalization of traditional
positions deploying the same type of technologies. Thus, while legal devices
may be instrumentalized for a variety of positions, certain positions can
become dominant through their continual repetition by the dominant legal
community. In other words, in any particular legal debate, formalist
arguments may be less convincing in the hands of progressives when a
"formalist" interpretation has already been authoritatively advanced by
traditionalists and accepted across the legal profession. As such, it may be
hard to beat them at their own game. In any case, the articulation of
alternatives using these same technologies is a valuable exercise, even if
such positions are not immediately likely to prevail. It challenges the
assumptions of necessitarianism and univocality associated with Latin
American law.
B. Sophisticated Dichotomists
Some scholars have continued in the tradition of critiquing the
discrepancy between formal state law and the workings of society. These
critiques are not merely a rehashing of the distinction articulated since at
least the times of Roscoe Pound. Such scholars attempt to bring new
insight to the dichotomy. 38 New linguistic and cultural studies theories are
brought to bear on the subject.
For example, some scholarship taking the existence of the duality as
established analyze the reasons for its persistence. One very well-developed
treatment of the topic pursued the symbolic power of law in Latin America.
Mauricio Garcia Villegas' La eficacia simb6lica del derecho draws on
much contemporary deconstructivist theory to analyze the role of law in
Colombia.139 Analogizing much of law to the preamble of many modem
constitutions, the symbolic work performed is highlighted. In a certain
respect, scholarship of this nature clearly provides a deeper analytic
approach and genuinely wrestles with the question of ineffective law
enforcement. Assuming the diagnosis is correctly identified, then, this work
138. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH (June Abbott trans., 1989).
139. See, e.g., MAURICIO GARCIA-VILLEGAS, LA EFICACIA SIMB6LICA DEL DERECHO (1993).
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attempts to understand the appeal of the existing situation; that is, the
preference for symbolic as opposed to effective enforcement.
Furthermore, this type of scholarship recognizes that the fonnal legal
system has a function. It may not be the function desired. Nonetheless, it
identifies the relevance or connection between state law and society at
large. In its most extreme rendition, the gap between law and society is
described in terms of an inorganic state law-quite unconnected to the local
citizenry. Symbolic power, for example, signals the ordering potential of
state law, even if such ordering depends on cognitive dissonance as its
basis.
Another excellent example, in line with neoliberal neo-
developmentalism, however, is the work of Hernando de Soto in Peru. 40
In his much acclaimed, The Other Path, de Soto draws on the descriptive
dualism of formal and informal sectors in Peru."4 The formal sector, in his
view, consists of the legal system, official institutions, and traditional social
groups such as industry associations, labor unions, and pressure groups. 42
The informal sector consists of mostly peasant migrants to urban areas
operating in the shadow economy.'43 For de Soto, it is not a sociological or
cultural difference which gives rise to the difference; rather, it is the
economic inefficiency of formal legal rules.'" In his words:
Let us take the invasion of state waste land as an example.
What explanation can wefindfor this phenomenon, ifwe view
it from a cultural or social standpoint? Is it an age-old
practice which reflects Peruvians' partiality for getting
together and invading other people's property? Of course
not .... From a legal standpoint, on the other hand, the
explanation is perfectly clear .... If the red tape were
reduced, there might still be people who would prefer to
invade land and risk all the adverse consequences, but they
would be a minority.... Although no one denies the relative
importance of social, cultural, or ethnic factors, we simply
have not found any evidence to bear out the theory that they
explain why a large sector of the population operates outside
the law.145
140. See, e.g., DE SOTO, supra note 138.
141. See id. at 80.
142. See generally id.
143. See generally id.
144. See id. at 185.
145. Id. at 185.
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De Soto's thesis is that the legal system discriminates against
"informals"--as such they have no choice but to bypass official law.' The
consequences of his view are that the formal legal system has lost social
relevance. Alternatively, formalizing the mix of motivation and incentives,
observable in the informal sector, would align the legal system with
economic growth. 47 De Soto's analysis retains the dichotomy between law
and society. He portrays it, however, as the product of economic
inefficiency rather than a different Latin American conception of the nature
of law.48 He bases his claims on empirical research of Peru's extensive
bureaucratic costs related to industry, housing, and transport. 49
It is hard to read de Soto's work without drawing a parallel to illegal
aliens in the United States. These informals also constitute a substantial
population excluded from the official legal system, systematically repressed
and denied constitutional rights. Moreover, a case can be made that all
groups or individuals-and their identifying activities-may claim the
quality of"informals" when disfavored by official law. Adopting economic
efficiency analysis may improve their lot, then again it might not. What de
Soto proposes is, in effect, to renegotiate societal conflicts by the lights of
economic efficiency.'"° If his proposal were adopted, and the criterion of
efficiency were paramount within legal decision-making, then the winners
and losers would indeed look different. In this way, his proposal is much
like the developmentalist one of a shift in legal methods as a mode of
triggering broad-scale reform. Unlike earlier developmentalists, however,
de Soto limits his method to the logic of economic gain while
developmentalists placed social justice and redistribution of wealth at the
top of their list.
This is not to say that this argument is a dead letter. Quite the contrary,
the argument that the duality, produced by the formal legal system, is
economically inefficient has had a receptive audience. Neoliberals have
146. See generally id.
147. Id. at 187.
It is simpler and cheaper to bring the formals and informals together by changing
the law than by trying to change the characteristics of the people. To show the
informals how the existing laws operate, or to try to convince them that they will
increase their social standing by accepting the mercantilist system inherited from
Spain, would be to alter their culture drastically. It makes more sense to adapt
the law to reality than to try to change everyone's attitudes, for the law is the
most useful and deliberate instrument of change available to people.
Id.
148. See generally id.
149. See generally id.
150. See generally id.
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embraced the point as a reason for stronger property and contract rights,
in the place of current law, situated beyond the reach of shifting political
deals.' 5' They claim that legal rules premised on the logic of efficiency are
better suited to promote development than the current, formal system
riddled with bureaucratic costs. Whether or not this new attempt at
overhauling the traditional legal deal is actually successful remains to be
seen. Neoliberalism in any case has some very diverse supporters.
From a more progressive perspective, deeper analyses of the gap
between law and society run parallel to developmentalism and neo-
developmentalism. They offer once and again the argument for system-wide
reform, but in the name of social justice rather than economic efficiency.
Surely, the distance between law on the books and law in action is a
plausible object of study. However, raising this question as the essential
problem with Latin American law, or as the best strategy for progressive
reform, is misguided.
The error stems from insisting on an already defeated 1960s strategy.
The notion is that effective social reform can be achieved through informal
law-led projects of social, economic, and political transformation. That is,
that elite power in Latin America, exercised through official law, can be
upset by a competing popular or social law. To the extent that reform-
minded progressive scholars continue in this belief, and thus continue to call
for informal law, they forego the potential for any actual effective reform
of the overall state. They in fact continue to reinforce the identity of the gap
and continue to cast their lot in the losing role.
C. Foreign-Modeled Realists
A new outcropping of legal scholarship has attempted to champion legal
pragmatism. Its basis of authority is a tried and true technique within Latin
American legal discourse. Foreign authorities are marshaled in support of
particular positions.152 In this version, various Latin American scholars have
151. Id. at 180. One passage is particularly illuminating:
It should be pointed out that the costs of informality also affect formals and
particularly increase the uncertainty of the costs of remaining formal, for there
is no property right, contract, or extracontractual liability which can be regarded
as constant when the state can use the legal system arbitrarily.
Id. While de Soto deploys the intellectual framework of developmentalism, i.e., social/legal
duality, his argument is not dependent on the differences between the formal and informal sectors
(essentially they are both inefficient save the informal sector is more inefficient) and is chiefly a
plea in favor of raising economic efficiency, in his reading co-terminous with strong property and
contract rights, as the guiding principle of legal reform over and above local political debate.
152. See Oscar Mejia, Cesar Rodriguez, and Isabel Cristina Jaramillo (articles on file with
author).
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been particularly attracted to U.S. academics, but also to some Europeans,
writing in the field of constitutional law, especially.'53 I will focus my
discussion on the general profile of this vein of scholarship.
Curiously, even relatively conservative sources are marshaled as
authority for progressive positions in Latin America. Defenders of the
legitimacy and objectivity of the existing U.S. and common law systems are
often called upon to fulfill quite a radical role. Figures such as Ronald
Dworkin and John Rawls are cited to support notions such as the
multiplicity of textual interpretations and the legitimacy of social
considerations. In their home terrain, these scholars are understood as
defenders of the system's built-in constraints on decisionmaking. Indeed,
they reinforce the legitimacy of legal decisionmaking, by reason of its
qualitative difference from political or other social influences.
The tactic becomes more understandable, however, in light of the
suppression of social argument within dominant Latin American legal
discourse, as discussed above. Instead of crafting an empirically-
demonstrable social sphere, foreign-modeled realists rely on traditionaljurists from other locales. In this way for example, a U.S. jurisprudence of
constraint in decision-making, which nevertheless recognizes the pliability
of interpretation and the primacy of policies and principles as tie-breakers,
offers Latin American progressives the room they need. Moreover, this
authority is claimed as deriving from within the legal system itself, that is,
as legal and not political. As such, legal operators pursuing this approach
are driven to engage the formal legal materials directly.
Some of the drawbacks of this strategy are parallel to its strengths.
Calling upon foreign authority is a well-known mode of legal argument
within Latin America. Therefore, proclaiming the genius and relevance of
particular foreign scholars is likely to be effective. Judging by recent
citations within constitutional decisions in some Latin American countries,
this strategy is already somewhat effective. However, it harbors the dangers
of ossifying a certain notion of the social, not as the dynamic interplay of
local societal interests and values, but rather, as some foreign-based
determination which may only be accessed by reference to foreign legal
materials or foreign scholars. In other words, the effectiveness of social
argument may be limited by reading it as narrowly inherent in foreign
sources, and possibly as transnational law. In this way, social
decisionmaking can be undermined and rendered unresponsive to local
conditions, instead of merely allowing for arguments based on "social"
developments in countries with similar constitutions or other legal
materials. Of course, this is only conjecture. Then again, it is based on the
153. See, e.g., Sandra Morelli, Universidad Externado de Colombia (article on file with
author).
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uses made in the past of foreign authority within Latin American legal
discourse. Whether foreign-modeled realism may "bridge the gap between
law and society" remains to be seen.
Additionally, foreign-based realism harbors an additional pitfall. It
presents the dilemma of marshaling foreign traditionalists for the purpose
of local, reformist objectives. To the extent that foreign traditionalists
subscribe to sociolegal discourse, however, this is not really an issue. It may
pose particular questions for comparativists immersed in the legal discourse
of both the United States (or Europe) and Latin America. However, the
conservative pedigree of the foreign model can only stand to reinforce the
Latin American reformer's position. The difficulty is that these same
authorities do not offer much beyond rhetorical uses of sociolegal
discourse. At some point, some of the very same critiques levied against
U.S. traditionalists, for example, would become relevant. In other words,
supporting foreign model realism may merely foist the limitations of U.S.
legal liberalism on Latin America. These limitations, as amply demonstrated
by critical scholars, are a serious concern.
However, the authority of the U.S. mainstream within contemporary
Latin American legal discourse, as discussed above, serves a very different
purpose. It provides expression for recurrently-repressed social-based
discourse within the formal legal system. Possibly at some point such
social-based discourse will be normalized in such a way that it may need to
be challenged. At this point in time, however, this reformist "liberal"
intervention can be quite a progressive move in certain fields.
VIII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Developmentalist writing on Latin America has drawn some of the
enduring images that we continue to hold about law in the region. This
body of scholarship emphasized the looming disconnection between law
and the social particularities of Latin American peoples. Another legacy of
developmentalism is that its end in the mid- 1970s is linked to the propensity
of social-based methods to politicize law. More than just any set of images,
this construction has had far-reaching effects. Specifically, it has reinforced
the opposition against social transformation through the legal systems of
Latin America.
By accepting the ultimatum posed by traditionalists in Latin America,
development scholars accepted their inability to challenge the existing
political deal. Cowed by fears of lawless societies out of control, absent a
well-maintained formal discourse of law's above-politics authority,
developmentalists desisted. They accepted the traditional deal cut by Latin
American jurists over the potential loss of the authority of law.
Additionally, they inspired a generation of Latin Americans and Latin
Americanists to pursue marginally-situated projects of reform. Accepting
FLOPIDA L.WREVIEW
the framework ofa more legitimate social normativity, heirs to this tradition
remain busily crafting the bases for a substitute to state law. This, however,
will likely not come. By definition, it is relegated to the dimension of
society and minority politics-no matter how many empirical studies and
research projects are conducted.
By contrast, traditional jurists preserve official legal discourse against
projects that threaten reform or militate in favor of a reevaluation of the
traditional political deal. In part defending the political status quo, in part
defending their own quite singular authority to speak for the law, traditional
Latin Americanjurists have prevented the legal system from responding to
widespread social demands. As such, rather than defuse political
grievances, they aggravate them. The state as a whole becomes open to
challenge and the legal system subject to charges of irrelevance.
Perceived gaps between legal and social spheres and the relative
unavailability of reformist social-legal discourse within Latin America are
not, however, particularly useful descriptions of intrinsic features of the
system. Rather, they are observations about the political projects and actors
who have dominated legal discourse in the region. Making the mistake of
accepting these as truths about Latin American law undermines the chances
for reform and the strategies available to achieve it.
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